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ABSTRACT 
THE 
UUSES OF FORMAL 
AND INFORMAL PLANS IN 
TOP EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. AND CANADIAN EXECUTIVES 
FEBRUARY 1987 
KENT D. CARTER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MAINE 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor A. Elliott Carlisle 
This study examines the two areas of planning and 
decision making at the top echelon of business 
organizations. Specifically, it explores the influence 
that the importance of the decision, the risk of a wrong 
decision, and the uncertainty of the business environment 
have on the executive's use of formal and/or informal plans 
to make that decision. Additionally, this study explores 
how Canadian and U.S. executives differ in their use of 
formal or informal plans. A survey was mailed to eight- 
hundred U.S. and Canadian business executives representing 
firms of all sizes across all standard industrial 
classifications. Thirty per cent of these top level 
executives responded by completing and returning the survey 
instrument. 
viii 
The results suggest that there are no significant 
differences between Canadian and U.S. executives in either 
their preference for formal or informal plans or their 
rational versus intuitive decision-making style. 
Furthermore, contrary to statements in the strategic 
management literature, both countries prefer using formal 
plans to make important decisions and are not influenced in 
their choice by turbulence in their business environments. 
As is suggested in the literature both U.S. and Canadian 
executives in this study prefer using formal plans to make 
risky decisions. 
Despite an apparent popular corporate trend away from 
formal planning systems, these surveyed executives find 
such plans useful and do not generally rely on intuitive, 
informal plans in making major corporate related decisions. 
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.. 
BSTRACT.viii 
LIST OF TABLES.xii 
LIST OF EXHIBITS.xiv 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION . 1 
Overview  1 
Background  2 
Problem Statement.4 
Design of the Study.7 
Contributions of the Research.10 
Limitations of the Research.10 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters.12 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.13 
Corporate Executive Decision-Making.14 
Corporate Strategic Planning.40 
The Role of the Top Executive in 
Decision-Making.62 
Cross-Cultural Comparative Management.72 
Sum ary.75 
III. METHODOLOGY.77 
Origination and Theorem Development.77 
Operational Definitions.79 
Hypotheses.81 
Confounding Variables.83 
The Study Sample.83 
The Research Instrument.89 
Data Collection, Procedures, and 
Processing.93 
The Executive Interviews.97 
Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing.98 
IV. PRESENTATION OF SURVEY RESULTS . 106 
Part I — The Respondent Profile.106 
Part II — Hypothesis Testing.115 
Part III — Verification of the Results. . . .151 
X 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.162 
Summary.162 
Implications and Conclusions  165 
Limitations and Recommendations for 
Future Research.168 
APPENDIX: COVER LETTERS, POSTCARDS, AND THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE . 172 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  183 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. Descriptive Studies of Managerial 
Decision-Making.15 
2. The Informal - Formal Dichotomy: A List of 
Terminology.34 
3. Strategic Planning Effects on Organizational. . . .52 
4. Instrument Reliability.105 
5. Delivered, Undelivered, and Refused 
Questionnaries.107 
6. Questionnaire Responses . 108 
7. Demographic Comparisons  Ill 
8. Respondent Vital Statistics  114 
9. Questions Related to Hypothesis ^1.118 
10. Questions Related to Hypothesis . 119 
11. Questions Related to Hypothesis  120 
12. Level of Agreement between Questions.123 
13. Questions Related to Hypothesis §2.126 
14. Questions Related to Hypothesis #2 127 
15. Level of Agreement between Questions.129 
16. Questions Related to Hypothesis §3.132 
17. Questions Related to Hypothesis §3 133 
18. Questions Related to Hypothesis §3.134 
19. Questions Related to Hypothesis §3 135 
20. Questions Related to Hypothesis §3.137 
21. Level of Agreement between Questions.138 
22. Level of Agreement between Questions.140 
xii 
23. Level of Agreement between Questions.142 
24. Questions Related to Hypothesis #4.144 
25. Questions for Canadian - U.S. Comparisons 
Hypothesis §5.146 
26. Questions for Canadian - U.S. Comparisons 
Hypothesis §5 147 
27. Questions for Canadian - U.S. Comparisons 
Hypothesis §5 148 
28. Questions for Canadian - U.S. Comparisons 
Hypothesis §S.150 
29. Non-Respondent to Respondent Differences.153 
30. The Respondent to Non-Respondent Issue.154 
31. Comparisons of Early and Late Respondents .... 155 
32. Analysis of Potentially Confounding Variables . . 157 
xiii 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
1 . The 
2. The 
Decision-Making Process: A Process Model. . 
Strategic Planning Process. 
. .18 
. .42 
xiv 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the two areas of planning and 
decision making at the highest echelon of business 
organizations. Specifically, it explores the influence 
that the importance of the decision, the risk of a wrong 
decision, the necessity to "buy time", and the uncertainty 
of the business environment have on the executive's use of 
formal and informal plans to make that decision. 
Additionally, this study explores how Canadian and U.S. 
executives differ in their use of formal or informal plans. 
Overview 
The field of strategic management lacks statistical 
evidence to document the corporate decision-making process. 
Andrews (1980), Ansoff (1965), Hofer & Schendel (1978), 
Lorange & Vancil (1977), Steiner (1979), Thompson & 
Strickland (1981), Braybrooke & Lindblom (1959) (1979), 
Mintzberg (1973), Quinn (1980), Wrapp (1967), and Nutt 
(1977) all develop decision-making theories. They present 
models and suggest research directions based on their case 
studies of corporate strategic decision-making processes. 
1 
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However, with few exceptions, little quantitative research 
has been used to document and clarify the observations made 
by these and other theorists. This study builds on the 
decision-making theories as well as expands the information 
base of this topic. 
Background 
Evidence concerning the utility of formal planning as 
a method for making decisions at the higher echelons of the 
organization would help solidify our knowledge related to 
the value of strategic planning systems. The recent 
findings of authors such as Leontiades and Tezel (1980), 
Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton (1984), and Pearce & Robinson 
(1985) suggest that corporate planning has no impact on 
corporate financial performance. However, it is not known 
if the plans are actually used in decision making, or if 
they are just corporate excercises published primarily to 
adorn executive office coffee tables. If they are, in fact, 
merely lavish trappings, then they will have no impact on 
corporate financial performance as the above authors have 
documented. 
Other authors discuss the decision-making dichotomy 
between intuitive and rational processes (see in particular 
Barnard, 1938; Leavitt, 1975; Jung, 1924; Pondy, 1983; 
3 
Mintzberg, 1976; Weick, 1983; Hurst, 1984; Janis & Mann, 
1977; Steiner, 1969). A few of these authors suggest that 
such a dichotomy is really a continuum between the two 
poles of intuitive and rational thinking (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Pondy, 1983; Quinn, 1980). Similar dichotomies are noted 
in the realm of strategic planning suggesting that plans 
can also be developed along a line between two points (see 
in particular Thune and House, 1970; Fulmer and Rue, 1974; 
Fox, 1981; and Steiner, 1979). Although the terminology 
varies extensively within the literature, these two points 
are usually labelled formal and informal. As noted 
previously researchers in the planning field have studied 
such issues as formal planning and positive corporate 
financial performance (Armstrong, 1982; Kudla, 1980; Thune 
and House, 1970; Herold, 1971; Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton, 
1984; Wood and LaForge, 1979; Fulmer and Rue, 1974; 
Ringbakk, 1971), formal planning and corporate size 
(Litschert and Nicholson, 1974; Lorange, 1980; Kallmann and 
Shapiro, 1978; Dror, 1971), formal planning and business 
environment stability (Litschert and Nicholson, 1974; 
Lindsay and Rue, 1980; Rhenman, 1972), formal planning and 
strategic decision-making (Brown, 1974; Eliasson, 1976; 
Leontiades and Tezel, 1980), the integration of planning 
into the corporate operations as it relates to corporate 
performance (Malik and Karger, 1975), formal planning and 
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implementation (Henry, 1977), and formal planning and 
informal planning as a pendular development (Lorange and 
Vancil, 1 977 ) . 
This study attempts what none of the above mentioned 
major research studies have done - it builds on present 
theory by pulling together the two areas of planning 
(formal and informal) and decision-making. Additionally, 
the study emphasizes the decision-making process. As 
exemplified by the corporate top executive, as Drucker 
(1966), Donaldson and Lorsch (1983), and Kotter (1982), 
suggest it is the chief executive officer who makes the 
final decisions. 
Problem Statement 
Several authors (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; and 
McCall and Kaplan, 1985) have discovered in their research 
that planning in a business organization appears to be very 
unsystematic, and, likewise, decision-making, by the top 
executive, to be rather haphazard, disjointed, and 
unrelated to the formal plans. Other authors point out 
that informal plans are more useful than formal plans for 
executive decision-making when the problem, opportunity, or 
crisis at hand is perceived to be important (Eliasson, 
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1976), when there is a need to adopt an extended time frame 
for choosing a decision option (Mintzberg, et al., 1975; 
Quinn, 1980), when the business environment is very 
turbulent (Armstrong, 1982), or when the problem is not 
very risky to the firms ultimate survival (Armstrong, 
1982). 
Lipset (1985) notes that numerous authors concerned 
with Canadian culture suggest that Canadian business people 
have a more conservative, traditional, and elitist approach 
to life than their colleagues in the United States. A 
recent study by Milman (1986) reveals eleven variables that 
account for the difference between U.S. and Canadian 
executive perceptions. The most prominent differences are 
the smaller Canadian domestic market size, a Canadian 
industrial structure that is more elitist in function, an 
organizational size that is 1/16 that of its U.S. 
competitors, and a management philosophy that favors low 
risk approaches to business practice. Frederick (1983) has 
suggested that Canadian executives are at least five to ten 
years behind their U.S. colleagues in the development and 
use of formal planning. U.S. top executives are believed 
to be moving away from formal planning and returning to 
more relaxed, informal planning methods. If Frederick 
(1983), Lipset (1985), and Milman (1986) and informal non 
academic observers of the business scene are correct, then 
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Canadian executives may well expected to favor formal 
planning methods in corporate decision making as did the 
U.S. executives of five years ago. 
Each of the aforementioned formal or informal planning 
issues is based on theoretical discussions which have not 
been statistically evaluated. By quantitatively testing 
these and related issues, this study broadens our 
understanding of corporate decision-making specifically as 
it relates to the use of formal and informal plans. The 
primary objective is to answer the following questions: 
- do corporate top executives of medium and large 
firms rely on and use informal as well as formal plans in 
making important corporate decisions, 
- and is there any difference between Canadian and 
U.S. CEOs in this regard. 
The secondary objectives of this study are as follows: 
- does the perceived importance and type of corporate 
problem, opportunity, or crisis make a difference in the 
choice of planning methods? 
- does a need to "buy time" or the urgency of the 
problem, opportunity, or crisis have a bearing on which 
planning method is chosen to make decisions? 
- does the stability or the volatility of the external 
environment have an effect on the planning method chosen to 
make important corporate decisions? 
7 
- does the uncertainty and risk of choosing a correct 
decision have an effect on which planning method is used to 
make that decision? 
Design of the Study 
Freeman and Lorange (1985: 33) state "the direction of 
current research in strategic management as it has evolved 
from the case method of business policy is that it is too 
'squishy'. There are too many concepts and there is too 
little empirical evidence that supports the concepts." 
Some authors suggest that the research method of choice 
should vary with the question of interest (Fredrickson, 
1983; Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Since much of the 
research concerning the corporate decision making process 
follows the "squishy" methods of qualitative ethnography, 
this study takes a quantitative approach followed by a 
qualitative method for validating the results. The 
population from which the sample is drawn consists of 
large, medium, and small sized firms. In this study, size 
is determined by the number of full time employees 
(Galbraith, 1974; OECD, 1979). Earlier research notes 
differences in planning by industry type (Litschert and 
Nicholson, 1974; Karger and Malik, 1975; Kudla, 1980; Thune 
and House, 1970; Wood and LaForge, 1981; Fulmer and Rue, 
8 
1973). This study attempts to control for these 
differences among and between U.S. and Canadian companies 
by appropriate statistical techniques. 
Data on top executive decision-making is gathered 
through the use of a mailed questionnaire. There has been 
extensive debate in the field of strategic management 
concerning the reliability and validity of information 
about executive thinking obtained through questionnaire 
instruments. A summary of that debate and a discussion of 
its merits, as related to this study, can be found in the 
methodology section of this document. The questionnaire 
was developed through a deductive process via reviewing 
prior, related research, developing hypotheses of interest, 
and constructing a five-part survey instrument. A panel of 
seven academic researchers reviewed and critiqued the 
closed-answer questions and suggested critical 
modifications both regarding question wording and 
instrument format. The initially revised questionnaire 
was administered in a semi-structured interview format to a 
group of five corporate chief executive officers. The 
final revised questionnaire instrument is used in a mailing 
to eight hundred U.S. and Canadian executives. 
The dependent variables "informal planning" and 
"formal planning" are each aggregates of several questions 
within the survey instrument. The independent variables 
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problem importance, problem urgency, delaying permanent 
decisions, business environment stability, and level of 
decision riskiness have been developed into hypotheses to 
be been tested against the dependent variables. 
Nonparametric statistical analysis is used to test these 
hypotheses (see the methodology section of this document 
for further information). A comparison will be made 
between U.S. and Canadian decision-making methods with such 
variables as industry type and organizational size being 
statistically controlled. 
Once the survey data is analyzed, follow-up interviews 
are conducted with a random sample of these eight hundred 
I 
executives. This coupling of both quantitative and 
qualitative (within the financial constraints of the study) 
research methods helps substantiate and validate 
generalization from the information. 
Contributions of the Research 
The value of this study lies in its intent to provide 
further documentation of how corporate executives do their 
jobs. As Kotter (1982) notes, CEOs make formal and 
informal decisions "both consciously and unconsciously in a 
process that is largely internal to their minds." The need 
to know how their minds work and what methodology they use 
10 
is directly related to today's management education. There 
is currently a general feeling that in the area of decision 
making business academics emphasize formal analytical tools 
and all but ignore the use of intuitive and informal tools. 
This study will help both scholars and practitioners to 
understand better the uses of formal and informal plans. 
Scholars will have documented evidence of what processes 
are being used for setting corporate directions, and 
practitioners information about how planning processes can 
be tailor-made to fit the present decision situation. 
Limitations of the Research 
Executive interviews are subject to pervasive personal 
biases, and observational case studies cannot isolate and 
control for all causal factors. One, therefore, is 
uncertain if the results are due to self-selection, the 
biases of the observer, the skills of the executive, or a 
host of other confounding influences. However, a joint 
interview-survey methodology substantiated through 
extensive non-respondent evaluations certainly reduces the 
impact such influences have had on this study. 
Several approaches are taken in an effort to 
substantiate the findings herein described. Not only are 
non-respondents thoroughly reviewed, but also random 
sampling techniques are used to select both the initial 
eight hundred questionnaire receivers and the executives to 
be personally interviewed. In spite of the efforts used to 
validate the questionnaire and verify its reliability, no 
research program can completely satisfy the triad of 
"success goals" labelled "simple", "generalizable", and 
"hard" evidence. It is impossible to control for all 
confounding variables. 
The intention of this study is to advance the 
knowledge of the methods corporate executives use in making 
corporate decisions when the environmental changes are 
volatile, the situation is important, the need to buy time 
is prevalent, and the risks of failure are great. However, 
no simple causal statements concerning these issues can be 
made without conducting other confirmatory research on the 
population as a whole. 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
The rest of this document is divided into six 
sections. Chapter II discusses extensively the pertinent 
theory and literature material related to the fields of 
corporate decision-making, formal and informal strategic 
planning, the corporate chief executive, and Canadian - 
U.S. comparative management studies. Chapter III further 
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develops the research theorems, hypotheses and the relevant 
research methodology used in this study. Chapter IV 
presents the results of the data analysis of the 
questionnaire instrument used in this study and provides a 
discussion of those results. Chapter V contains a summary 
and conclusion section which provides a synopsis of the 
value of this research. The bibliography and appendix 
display information that allow this study to be replicated 
and/or expanded by future researchers. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review chapter has four interrelated 
parts. The first part reviews the process of corporate 
decision making in the upper echelons of the business 
organization. The second part carefully scrutinizes the 
field of strategic planning as a method for making 
corporate decisions. The third part examines the role of 
the corporate top executive especially as it relates to the 
use of formal or informal plans for decision making. Part 
four provides a synthesis of the literature that compares 
U.S. and Canadian executives on the basis of their 
decision-making methods. While each of these sections 
stands alone as a separate literature review of the 
designated subject area, the intent is to link each topical 
part to each of the other parts and thereby develop the 
foundation upon which this study is built. A summary 
section at the end of this chapter reiterates the 
relationships among these topics. 
13 
Corporate Executive Decision-making 
Decision-Making Research 
The decision making methods of interest to this study 
primarily involve descriptions of how individual top 
executives process information to make a final decision. 
In this type of research there are three main streams of 
analysis: 
1. model-fitting studies 
2. process-tracing studies 
3. cognitive-decisional style studies. 
The descriptive method of studying organizational decision 
making focuses on the middle or lower level manager (Allan, 
1981; Aguilar, 1967; Bourgeois, 1980; Fox and Montcalm, 
1982; Grinyer and Spender, 1979; Hussey, 1974; Mintzberg, 
et.al., 1975, etc.), usually uses questionnaire and 
observational methods to gather data, and is primarily 
concerned with process-tracing (see Table 1). A review of 
these studies suggests that while many authors specify 
upper level management as their target audience very few 
actually focus on the CEO. Researchers to date tend to 
group corporate executives, from vice president up, 
together in a common domain. Even the recent best seller 
books (Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983; 
Geneen and Moscow, 1984; lacocca 
15 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Studies of Managerial Decision-Making 
Study: Author & Date N Method of Level of 
Analysis Managers 
Carlson, 1951 10 
Mintzberg, 1971 5 
Cohen, March, and 
Olsen, 1972 NA 
Cohen & March, 1974 42 
McKenney & Keen, 1974 107 
Peters, Hammond NA 
Summers, 1974 
Mihalasky, 1975 36 
Mintzberg, et.al. 25 
1 975* 
Stewart, 1976 16 
Horvath and NA 
McMillan, 1979* 
Mihalasky and NA 
Dean, 1979 
Lyles and 33 
Mitroff, 1980 
Fahey, 1981 30 
Jones, 1982 200 
Shrivastava and 61 
Grant, 1982* 
Donaldson and 12 
Lorsch, 1983 
observation CEO 
observation CEO 
NA NA 
observation college 
presidents 
questionnaire MBA* s 
lab experiment NA 
lab experiment CEO's 
questionnaire/ 
interviews 
middle/ 
upper 
observation/ 
diary 
upper to 
lower 
interviews middle 
lab experiment upper 
questionnaire/ 
interviews 
upper/ 
middle 
questionnaire upper 
questionnaire upper 
questionnaire middle 
interview/ CEO 
16 
Study: Author & Date N Method of 
Analysis 
Level of 
Managers 
Frederickson, 1984 1 52 questionnaire middle/ 
upper 
Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984 
NA questionnaire upper 
Nutt, 1984 312 interviews middle/ 
upper 
McCall and 
Kaplan, 1985* 
40 questionnaire middle 
* = "process tracing" studies 
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and Novak, 1984; Levinson and Rosenthal, 1984) attempting 
to analyze the corporate chief executive officer do not 
develop extensive empirical research. Few of these or 
other works carefully study the cognitive style and 
decision making process of the top executive or attempt to 
adapt a decision-making model (see Exhibit 1) to the actual 
process used by CEOs. If one assumes the top executive is 
the primary authority in the organization (outside the 
boardroom), then to understand how important corporate 
decisions are made one must examine that single 
individual*s decision-making methods. 
As mentioned earlier, the majority of these 
descriptive studies use questionnaire methods of data 
collection. Some researchers comment on the severe 
difficulty of validating data obtained in this manner (see 
in particular Lyles and Mitroff, 1980). Mintzberg, et.al. 
(1975, p. 250) note that "tapping the memories of the 
decision maker can introduce two forms of error-distortion 
(deliberate or unconscious) and memory failure." The 
actual decision process may remain in the CEO's head and 
may not be obtained by truly objective means. More recent 
research (see Frederickson, 1984; Halal, 1984; Hogarth & 
Makridakis, 1981; Nutt, 1984) attempts to use either more 
robust statistical methodology or more extensive in depth 
information gathering techniques. Whether the quantitative 
Exhibit 1 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
(A Process Model) 
approach or the qualitative approach is more valuable is 
not the significant question. What meaningful is 
trustworthy information that advances knowledge. Perhaps 
a combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies will be the most beneficial to this 
advancement (Jick, 1979). 
Definitions 
Much of the lack of advancement in research concerning 
informal and formal planning as decision making methods is 
due to a never-ending struggle to reinvent definitions 
(Camerer, 1985; Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Bower, 1970). 
Before the informal versus formal decision making modes are 
examined, clarification of some important related terms is 
necessary. "Problems" can be defined as the discrepancies 
found in comparing an existing state of affairs against 
some standard or desired state or as the evaluation of end 
results against goals (MacCrimmon and Taylor, 1976 and 
Mintzberg, et al., 1975). "Problem solving" is the process 
of searching, finding, analyzing, and creating. It can be 
defined as finding or developing a solution (DeLuca and 
Stumpf, 1981 and Mintzberg, et al., 1975). Problem 
structure depends upon how familiar the problem solver is 
with the initial state when the problem is noted, the 
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desired state at conclusion, and how the problem is 
transformed from one state to the next (Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979; Taylor, 1974; and Mintzberg, et al., 1975). 
Ill-structured problems usually arise when the available 
information is "fragmentary, ambiguous, and riddled with 
uncertainty" (Grinyer and Spender, 1979, p. 114), 
Mazzolini (1981) suggests that strategic decisions are 
unstructured or non-repetitive decisions. Drucker further 
notes (1973, p. 471) that the decision choice is "rarely a 
choice between right and wrong but rather a choice between 
almost right and probably wrong." Lyles and Mitroff (1980) 
find in their study that ninety percent of the problems 
reported by managers are ill-defined problems. McCall and 
Kaplan (1985) report that nearly twenty-two percent of the 
daily problems handled by their surveyed managers are of 
the ill-defined variety (It should be noted that the 
subjects in the McCall & Kaplan studies are all middle 
level managers.) Cyert and March (1963) focus primarily on 
organizational "programmed" or structured problems. These 
types of organizational problems are usually related to 
operational issues and do not (or should not), therefore, 
normally reach the CEO level of the organization. 
Mintzberg, et.al. (1975), define decision making as a 
specific commitment to action. A decision process is a set 
of actions leading to a decision. Unstructured refers to 
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the decision process itself "for which no predetermined and 
explicit set of ordered responses exists in the 
organization" (Mintzberg, et al., 1975, p. 246). In the 
final analysis then, the strategic decision process is 
characterized by novelty, complexity, ambiguity, open- 
endedness, time constraints, irrevocability, and the 
futurity of present concerns. The problems are highly 
unstructured and, as Ackoff (1974) notes, easily termed 
"messes." Management, therefore, is frequently the art of 
making decisions about unstructured problems with 
insufficient information. 
McKenney and Keen (1974) note that problem solving 
includes problem finding (see also Pounds, 1969 and 
Livingston, 1971) and today more and more problems are 
being found. This seems to be because greater uncertainty 
and faster communications are pushing final decisions to 
higher and higher levels for quick action (Collins, 1980). 
The harried executive is finding that decision analysis is 
not a panacea but rather just an approach to provide help 
in the decision-making process. Drucker (1954) states that 
problem-solving decisions are routine and usually 
unimportant while the important decisions, those that 
really matter, are strategic. These "strategic" decisions 
involve defining the situation, defining the appropriate 
resources, and making the appropriate choice. Because a 
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strategic problem cannot be easily structured, it is very 
difficult not only to find but also to formulate (see in 
particular Taylor, 1974; Mintzberg, et al., 1975; 
MacCrimmon and Taylor, 1976; and Shrivastava and Grant, 
1982), Ramaprasad and Mitroff (1984) write 
...formulating a strategic problem in different 
ways can result in different solutions to 
the same problem" and "an error in formulating 
a strategic problem can result in solving the 
wrong problem...(p. 597) 
Making a problem when none exists is referred to as a "Type 
III" error (Ramaprasad and Mitroff, 1984, p.597). 
The Rational Decision Making Process 
Some theorists today feel problem-solving and 
decision-making models are too rational in their approach. 
Weick (1983) notes: 
...linear models (of decision making) have only 
modest relevance to everyday thinking. Even if 
people tried to implement them, they would find 
them foreign to what they are trying to do... 
(p. 241). 
Kunreuther (1969) argues that man is so erratic in his 
actual behavior that the models of a rational decision 
maker are totally useless. 
It now appears that top executive decisions involve 
not just the use of a step-by-step decision making 
sequence, but also the use of experience, judgment, and 
subjectively assigned probabilities under conditions of 
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incomplete information. The rational models are, in most 
cases, a useful description but not very practical for 
everyday use at the top executive level in business 
organizations• 
One of the intents of the decision-making models 
espoused in the strategic management literature is to help 
the executive make good decisions. It was suggested 
earlier that the CEO in the firm deals primarily with 
complex, unstructured problems. Efforts to solve these 
important (strategic) problems must be herculean 
(Mazzolini, 1981) in order for the firm to survive. The 
generally recommended framework is to formulate the 
problem, gather the facts, generate and identify the 
alternatives, evaluate each alternative, and make the 
optimal choice (Bower, 1970; Drucker, 1954; Mintzberg, 
et.al., 1975; Schrenk, 1969; Simon, 1957; Witte, 1972) (see 
Exhibit 1, page 18). 
Shrivastava and Grant (1982) suggest that decisions 
made using the above or similar models have certain 
characteristics. They require the expenditure of large 
amounts of resources, have an impact on the entire 
organization, are influenced by the external environment, 
and, as noted earlier, are novel and complex. Drucker 
(1973), on the other hand, notes that Japanese executives 
make decisions using quite a different process. Drucker 
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explains this difference as follows; 
...In the West, all the emphasis is on the 
answer to the question. Indeed, our 
books on decision-making try to develop 
systematic approaches to giving an answer. 
To the Japanese, however, the important 
element in decision-making is defining 
the question. The answer to the question 
(what the West considers the decision) 
follows from its definition." (p. 467-68) 
In spite of these clearly and precisely developed 
models of decision making, their application to the real 
world has had limited success. March (1978) points out 
that researchers and academics alike should not be ashamed 
to put our knowledge and theories to work. He believes it 
is acceptable to develop theoretical models and test them 
in real organizations. If models fail, as they tend to do 
when they are examined in the field, then one must find out 
why. Simon (1978, p. 8) suggests the reason models of 
decision making do not seem to represent actual occurrences 
is because "in complex situations there is likely to be a 
considerable gap between the real environment and the 
environment as the actor perceives it." We can never 
truely know the environment for it is as we enact it. If 
the problems don't lend themselves to explicit formulation, 
then the formal decision making model is of little 
relevance (McKenney and Keen, 1974). The rational decision 
making process, as declared in the models, is suited to 
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solving programmed and cleanly structured problems but not 
the ill-structured problems confronted at the higher 
echelons of the corporation. 
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Rational Versus Intuitive Deci 
Making Processes 
Mintzberg (1982, p. 281) notes that organizational, 
strategic, decision making "appears to be largely 
intuitive" anyway. "A handful of scientists and academics 
have come up with measurable proof that subconscious 
elements play a role in the decision making process" 
(Rowan, 1979, p. 111). The dichotomy between rational/ 
analytic and intuitive/judgmental decision making has been 
discussed for decades but especially since the advent of 
Frederick Taylor's (1947) so-called "scientific management’ 
methodology. Mintzberg (1973a) says the CEO pays lip 
service to systematic long-range planning, elaborate tables 
of organizations, and reliance on computers, in reality 
he's a 'holistic', intuitive thinker who enjoys a chaotic 
climate. Maybe this is why purely rational decision making 
models seem useless when plugged into the corporate 
decision making process. If the top executive is really 
just a holistic, intuitive thinker who cares little for the 
formal planning process, then perhaps the formal planning 
process is a waste of corporate resources. The most likely 
case is one in which the executive relies on the formal 
planning process to deepen his/her knowledge and experience 
base for storage in the brain's archives where it remains 
readily accessible to that individual's subconscious 
intuiting process. 
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Some theorists suggest that each individual carries a 
distinct personality type with a predisposition toward 
either the rational or the intuitive decision-making modes. 
McKenney and Keen (1974) note: 
...perceptive individuals focus on relationships 
between items and look for deviations from or 
conformities with their expectations (intuitive 
decision making). Receptive thinkers focus on 
detail rather than relationships and try to 
derive the attributes of the information from 
direct examination (rational decision making)... 
(p. 80). 
They also suggest that these two modes of thinking relate 
more to human propensity than to human capacity to deal 
with problems. Mason and Mitroff (1973) note a thinking 
individual relies primarily on cognitive processes, and 
he/she evaluates situations by using abstract true/false 
judgments. The intuitive person, however, tends to 
evaluate situations along personal lines (e.g. good/bad, 
pleasant/unpleasant and like/dislike). He/she is apt to 
see analytical tools as a supplement to, not a substitute 
for, good thinking processes (Fox, 1981). 
Early comparisons of these two decision making modes 
are provided by Charles Lindblom (1959). However, before 
Lindblom's seminal work, Chester Barnard (1938) spent 
considerable effort noting the value of intuiting in 
business organizations. Remembering that Barnard's 
writings take place during the national love affair with 
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"scientific management" (Taylor, 1947), it is all the more 
extraordinary that he places his primary emphasis on 
informal decision making. Barnard writes (1938, p. 301- 
322) that logical reasoning processes are increasingly 
necessary but are of lower order value to the executive and 
must be subordinated to highly developed intuitional 
processes. 
Lindblom provides intuitive decision making with a 
process. He writes that decisions are not definitive 
because problems themselves are continually changing. He 
believes decision making is a process of "successive 
approximations to some desired objectives" (1959, p. 86) 
and those objectives, themselves, continue to change under 
reconsideration. What Lindblom suggests is that it is not 
only the problem that is ill-structured and nebulous but 
also the desired ends. Therefore, the executive proceeds 
by a process of "successive limited comparisons." He 
further suggests that the experience based CEO can make 
good decisions without relying on a rational-scientific 
process. 
Other authors since Lindblom agrees with his ideas. 
Wrapp (1967) even suggests that executives never really 
make major policy decisions. Quinn (1980) notes that 
process described by Lindblom and Wrapp is a "logical 
incrementalism" approach. Quinn attempts to give the 
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intuitive decision making process a more rationalistic 
flavor. Blackburn (1971) would agree with Quinn that the 
intuitive process can become more rationalistic with 
appropriate training. Pondy (1983) and Mintzberg (1973) 
suggest that there are really three rather than two modes 
of decision making: rational, intuitive, and a combination 
(union) of these two. 
Intuitive decision making seems to be subconscious or 
preconscious. Issack (1978) says "sudden insights of 
intuition are evidence of unconscious work below the level 
of the rational mind". This preconscious process of 
intuitive decision making is perhaps why both Hotter 
(1982b) and McCall, Kaplan and Gerlach (1982) note that 
managers seem to act thoughtfully but spend no time 
thinking. Weick (1983) provides three plausible 
explanations for the observation that managers don't think: 
1. Managers do think, but not while on the job. 
2. Managers are so good at what they do they don't 
need to think. 
3. Managers think all the time but researchers have 
missed it. 
If intuitive decision making takes place at the 
subconscious level of the human thought processes (see 
Hotter, 1982, p. 161), then the researcher is very likely 
to miss that activity totally. There will be few outward 
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signs of "intuiting" but rather what appears to be just a 
"shoot from the hip" decision termination. Bruner (1979, 
p. 21) suggests these surprise insights "grow" out of 
"combinatorial activity" or placing things in a new 
prespective through the slow accretion of knowledge. A 
process that is not easily noticed through surface 
observations. 
The Intuiting Process 
There are numerous citations of the uses of intuitive 
decision making. Kraft (1980) discusses how General Motors 
Corporation used a combination intuitive and rational 
decision making process in deciding to downsize their car 
line (even if the decision was late). Long (1982) provides 
an enlightening review of how one man used "gut feelings" 
in managing Coke's foreign financial markets. Hurst (1984) 
describes the linkage of "hard box" and "soft bubble" 
decision making in the turn-around of a major corporate 
division in Canada. Although the rational decision-making 
models may not be appropriate at the upper echelons of the 
organization, this does not mean the rational process is 
without value. As Hurst (1984, p. 79) notes, "The rational 
model isn't wrong; it just isn't enough." Logic (rational 
decision making) really only plays a role when arranging 
the words, the parsed chunks, the ideas after the 
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conclusions have already been reached (Saaty, 1980; Weick, 
1977). When humans make final decisions, personal 
preferences, persuasion, gut feelings, and emotion prevail 
over a clear and concise logic or rationality. However, 
rational, analytical, factual presentations will have 
persuasive impact on the final outcome of any 
organizational decision process. 
The fields of psychology and phenomenology delve 
deeply into the study of the human mind and its functioning 
as it relates to human decision-making processes. Those 
efforts have lead to the development of a large field of 
study devoted totally to understanding the human mind in 
its decision-making capacity. This field is sometimes 
referred to as part of the decision sciences. Herbert 
Simon (1960) is perhaps the best known of the researchers 
in this area. The decision sciences and related 
psychological approaches to studying decision-making and 
cognition take more of a theoretical approach in their 
study than is the intent of this research. While these 
fields of inquiry add much to our understanding of the 
decision-making process very little study evolves around 
how top business executives actually make their important 
corporate decisions. Therefore, this study does not 
attempt to analyze directly such psychological attributes 
as perceptual ability, information capacity, risk-taking 
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propensity, and aspiration levels as they relate to human 
decision-making but does, instead, analyze the processes 
external to the executive's mind. 
A review of the commonly used decision-making terms 
suggests three major categories of similar research 
approaches (see Table 2). The first major grouping is that 
of cognitive versus affective (see in particular Barnard, 
1938; Hurst, 1984; Jung, 1924; Leavitt, 1975; Mihalasky, 
1975; Mintzberg, 1982; Myers, 1962; Ramaprasad and Mitroff, 
1984; Saaty, 1980; Taggart and Robey, 1981). The rational 
executive, in the view of these authors, is more concerned 
with intellectual, reasoning, thinking, and sensing than 
with intuiting, soft, personal, subjective, feeling types 
of decision making processes. They emphasize, however, the 
non-rational, emotional human being in their writings. A 
second grouping of authors places emphasis on human brain 
activity and how people decipher, recode, store, recall, 
and use data (see in particular Blackburn, 1971; Camillus, 
1982; Greiner, Leitch and Barnes, 1970; Lindblom, 1959; 
Mintzberg, 1976; Smith, 1978; Weick, 1983). Their primary 
interest is understanding how human beings come to use one 
method over another and whether or not there are 
physiological reasons for these differences (a scientific 
approach). A third group is concerned with how the 
rational approach can be contrasted to a political view of 
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man's attempt at making decisions in large organizations 
(those of note include Fahey, 1981; Halah, 1984; Hovath and 
McMillan, 1979). Other approaches to the dichotomy problem 
found in eastern versus western philospohies (Yang and 
Yin); Pondy, 1983 (an incremental approach); Fox, 1981 
(confirmatory versus conceiving); Eliasson, 1976 
(unimportant versus important); Janis and Mann, 1977 (a 
psychological approach). 
What is apparent from the above review is that the 
desire to discuss and analyze the rational/intuitive 
dichotomy cuts across all fields of social science inquiry. 
From the humanisitic to the scientific, from the political 
to the philosophical, from the behavioral to the 
phenomenological, numerous theorists of differing 
persuasions are interested in the topic, and all have a 
favored means of defining the other side of rational. 
Ferber (1967, p. B-520) even prefers to divide the term 
rational into the two components of rational decisions and 
rationalized decisions (another form of psychological 
analysis). A realization that the rational-intuitive 
decision making processes are involved in all aspects of 
human endeavor cannot be ignored. 
The view of intuitive decision making provided by the 
above discussion is one of chaos and ambiguity. It seems 
reasonable to suspect that when the corporate president 
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TABLE 2 
THE INFORMAL - FORMAL DICHOTOMY 
A LIST OF TERMINOLOGY 
Author: Date Rational View Intuitive View 
Taggart & Pondy logical-rational mysterious/intuitive 
(1981) cognitive/analytic affective/unsystematic 
Barnard logical-reasoning non-logical/aesthetic 
(1938) subordinate superior 
Leavitt analytic wisdom/feelings 
(1975) 
Mintzberg 
(1976) 
left hemisphere 
logical, linear 
language, accountants 
planners, lawyers 
explicit, verbal, 
argument, intellectual 
"formal planning" 
right hemisphere 
holistic, relational 
visual comprehension 
emotions, gestures 
artists, sculptors 
politicians, implicit 
spatial, gestalt, 
"informal planning" 
Jung 
(1924) 
Sensation-Thinker 
conscious 
Intuitive-Feeling 
unconscious 
Eastern Yang 
Philosophy 
Yin 
Hovath & McMillan rational, 
(1979) analytical 
objective 
behavioral, 
political 
phenomenological 
Camillus 
(1982) 
comprehensive 
synoptic 
Logical Incrementalism 
(bounded rationality) 
Pondy rational = analytical intuitive = synthetic, 
(1983) sequential, convergent simultaneous, divergent 
detailed, logical, holistic, artistic, 
scientific, digital patterns, analogue 
Author: Date Rational View Intuitive View 
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Author: Date Rational View Intuitive View 
Ramaprasad & thinking: logical feeling: value-laden 
Mitroff (1984) impersonal, personal, 
objective subjective 
Myers (1962) Sensing-thinking Intuiting-feeling 
Luca and Stumpf 
(1981 ) 
Frederickson 
(1984) 
problem-solving 
convergent 
comprehensive 
decision-making 
divergent 
non-comprehensive 
Mintzberg 
(1982) 
hard, 5 senses 
front-end selection 
soft, 6th sense 
back-end selection 
Ohmae 
(1982) 
rational, by-the- 
numbers 
natural, instinctive 
Fox (1981) confirmatory, 
quantitative 
conceiving, 
experience 
McKenney & Keen, 
(1974) 
receptive, 
systematic 
perceptive, 
intuitive 
Lindblom 
(1 959) 
"the root method" 
ground-up 
"the branch method" 
add-on 
Greiner, Leitch, objective, 
Barnes (1970) intellect 
subjective, 
intuition 
Blackburn educated 
(1971 ) 
trained 
Cyril Smith constituted facts imaginative 
(1978) 
Weick linear, sequential non-logical, right-brain 
(1983) 
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Author: Date Rational View Intuitive View 
Hurst 
(1984) 
hard box: static, 
clarity, context 
fact, science, written 
know, control, 
solve, sequential, 
conscious, learn, 
knowledge, full, 
description, lens. 
soft-bubble: fluid 
ambiguity, process 
perception, art, oral 
feel, influence, 
dissolve, lateral, 
unconscious, remember 
remember, wisdom, 
parable, mirror. 
Toda analytical, rational predictions, sense 
(1980) 
Saaty rational, logic, plays feelings, experience 
(1 980) 
Mihalasky cognitive, numbers pre-cognition, guesses 
(1975) 
Mintzberg & formal detailed personal vision. 
Waters (1983) plan, rigid flexible 
Dror explicit, analytic 
(1975) 
Eliasson unimportant decisions 
(1976) 
Fahey analytical/intellectual 
(1981 ) 
Halal systematic, formal 
(1984) 
Mintzberg reflective 
(1975) 
Janis & conscious, objective 
Mann (1977) 
spontaneous, intuitive 
important decisions 
behavioral/political 
ad hoc, informal 
discontinuous, doers 
subconscious, personal 
Ferber 
(1967) 
rational decisions rationalized decisions 
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must deal with ambiguous problems s/he may resort to and 
rely more heavily upon intuitive decision-making processes. 
In an effort to articulate this process, referred to as 
"organized anarchy", Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) suggest 
the "Garbage Can Model." "The garbage can process is one 
in which problems, solutions, and participants move from 
one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the 
nature of the choice, the time it takes, and the problems 
it solves all depend on a relatively complicated 
intermeshing of elements" (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, p. 
157). They note that the Garbage Can process or system 
does not "solve" problems but does provide information so 
that choices can be made. This system seems submerged in 
the human mind and, therefore, unknowable. Cohen, March, 
and Olsen actually provide a good model of the intuitive 
process. This model can be compared to models of rational 
processes. Unfortunately, little follow-up work has been 
done in using the Garbage Can Model in such an analysis. 
Mitroff and Emshoff (1979) suggest that a dialectic 
approach to planning (and decision making) is a useful tool 
when dealing with what Ackoff (1974) and Wildavsky (1973) 
refer to as "messes" or highly unstructured problems. 
Others disagree (see Cosier, 1981). 
Regardless of which approach the CEO prefers to use in 
problem-solving, the point is the intuitive, non-logical. 
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behavioral side of decision making must be recognized and 
understood. This requires a new and vigorous effort at 
documenting and examining the intuiting process through 
vigorous studies (Schwenk, 1984). How formal, rational 
decision making processes can be used to support the 
manager in his/her use of intuitive decision making must be 
discovered. Planning is a formal system for determining 
what future actions need to be taken (see Drucker, 1973, p. 
129 & 611; Steiner, 1979, p. 13-14; and Armstrong, 1978, p. 
6), but how can the formal planning processes be linked to 
the intuitive decision making process. Ohmae (1982) notes 
that the old breed of natural instinctive strategists 
(executives) are being replaced by a new breed of rational, 
by-the-numbers, strategists. His fear is that such a 
replacement will limit future business organization growth 
because the creative processes within the human mind will 
be stifled. Ohmae states (p. 4) "successful business 
strategies result not from rigorous analysis but from a 
particular state of mind." The top executive, today, most 
likely uses the formal planning system as one means of 
further honing his/her intuitive decision making skills. 
Either reduced availability of "data-driven" information or 
limitations placed on executive decision-making creativity 
will greatly hamper successful corporate decision-making. 
If effective management is to continue in businesses. 
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researchers must help by insuring that the true and 
realistic value of intuitive decision making is not only 
explored but exposed to the executives themselves. This is 
not necessarily something new they haven't known, but 
perhaps by legitimizing the value of such processes, the 
denial that seems to have sustained the field during these 
past twenty to thirty years will be rectified. Issack 
(1978) reviewed twenty-five popular undergraduate 
management text books that were written between 1974 and 
1978. Only three acknowledge intuition and/or intuitive 
decision making in any form. Some colleagues say that 
research that is immediately applicable to daily business 
situations is not deep or hard enough. Simon (1979) says: 
...it is a vulgar fallacy to suppose that 
scientific inquiry can't be fundamental if 
it threatens to become useful. The real 
world is perhaps the most fertile of all 
sources of good research questions calling 
for basic scientific inquiry... (p. 494). 
The role that intuitive decision making plays in everyday 
executive activity simply underscores the importance of 
descriptive research (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1982). 
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Corporate Strategic Planning 
The theory of planning that most closely guides this 
section is that presented by deSmit and Rade (1980) who say 
a theory of planning concerns planning methods, knowledge 
of decision making methods, and processes by which policies 
are determined. deSmit and Rade (1980) continue by saying 
planning can be viewed as holistic, continuous, and 
anticipatory in taking and making decisions. It is a 
process embracing the preparation, taking, evaluating, and 
implementing of a set of inter-related decisions leading to 
a desired future. This view-point is that of the 
rationalistic planner, but such a process is only desirable 
and meaningful if it is based on the conviction that the 
top executive's decisions really have an impact on the 
future. The disadvantage of such a process is that it 
reduces phenomena down to an understandable, simplified, 
coherent body of information which may or may not, in its 
final form, reflect reality. However, as Bartunek, Gordon, 
and Weathersby (1983, p. 274) note "no single theory (of 
planning) completely or correctly represents most 
phenomena." 
The formal structured planning process parallels quite 
closely that of the rationalistic corporate decision making 
process models discussed in the preceding section. The 
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formal planning process entails establishing objectives, 
strategies, or alternative courses of action (formulate the 
problem); pursuing all courses of action in a game plan or 
scenario fashion (collect data and evaluate alternatives); 
choosing a course of action or strategy (make a decision); 
and implementing the plan (Fahey, 1981) (see Exhibit 2). 
Mintzberg (1978) suggests there are essentially three 
different and definable corporate planning processes: the 
planning mode, depicting a highly ordered process; the 
adaptive mode, depicting a method of planning that is, at 
once, both disjointed and incremental; and the 
entrepreneurial mode, depicted as informal, intuitive 
planning where no formal methods are detectable in the 
processes used. Most executives will use and rely on a 
combination of these processes. Executive psychological 
predisposition toward one or the other is likely but 
reliance upon one method while abstaning from the other two 
is a highly unlikely procedure in the successful corporate 
decision maker. Mintzberg goes on to suggest that a plan 
is a strategy (1978, p. 935) and that strategic means 
important to the survival of the firm (1975, p. 246). As 
noted earlier, Drucker (1954) also defines the important 
corporate problems, that require action by the top 
executive, as strategic decisions. 
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Exhibit 2 
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Definitions 
Numerous business policy and strategy professionals 
have lamented the confused and ambiguous state of the 
professional language. Camerer (1985, p. 2) says we need a 
new, unambiguous, specialized vocabulary. Schendel and 
Hofer (1979) urge the development of a commonality of 
definitions and constructs. In his article "The Historical 
Development of the Strategic Management Concept," Bracker 
(1980) lists seventeen different, viable, and published 
definitions of strategic management. Even the continuous 
debate over the label strategic management or business 
policy, or business policy and strategy tends to lend 
credence to the belief that no solid theoretical base for 
the field has been established. For as Simon (1946) says 
if there is no comprehensive term that covers these sub¬ 
purposes, then we are not dealing with a scientifically 
based subject matter. 
In another related example, the terms formal and 
informal planning, while certainly recognized as containing 
different content, are not clearly enough defined to be 
operationalized empirical observations. No clear line of 
demarcation exists between the two types of planning. It 
is even more ambiguous than the definitional problem 
discussed earlier concerning rational versus intuitive 
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decision making. A review of the planning literature 
attests to this point (Fox, 1981; Kudla, 1980; Wood and 
LaForge, 1979; Herold, 1971; Armstrong, 1982; Al-Bazzaz and 
Grinyer, 1980; Karger and Malik, 1975; Camillus, 1975; 
Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, Porter, and Radosevich, 1970; 
Homer, Long, and Pecho (see Vancil, Aguilar, Howell, and 
McFarlan, 1969); Kallman and Shapiro, 1978; Fulmer and Rue, 
1974; Shrader, Taylor and Dalton, 1984). In not one of 
these articles is both "formal" and "informal" planning (or 
their expressed equivalents) clearly defined and 
operationalized. Rittel and Webber (1973) refer to these 
problems in defining terms, especially as related to 
"planning", as justifiable because of the nature of the 
problems. As they note, "planning problems are inherently 
wicked" (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p. 160). 
On the other side of this debate. Bower (1970, p. 637) 
indicates that "refining language to talk about well 
described problems is a marginal contribution." In Bower's 
view the field is clearly defined by authorities such as C. 
Roland Christensen and Kenneth Andrews, while other authors 
are not satisfied with these definitions. 
Planning Defined 
Planning, as a general business term, is defined in 
numerous and varied ways. Steiner (1979, p. 9) says it 
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deals with "the futurity of current decisions". Mintzberg 
(1976, p. 53) says planning means "thinking ahead." 
Houlden (1980, p. 107) says the main purpose of planning is 
"to assist a better choice between alternative strategies". 
The list of definitions is long and seemingly endless. 
This fact certainly lends credence to Camerer's (1985) 
contention that an ambiguous professional language is the 
major problem the policy field faces today. 
One point of agreement can be noted. Each of these 
afore mentioned writers discuss planning in terms of the 
future. Given this futurity concept, is planning 
synonymous with forecasting? Armstrong (1978) attempts to 
clarify this issue by noting that planning is concerned 
with determining what the future should look like while 
forecasting is concerned with determining what the future 
will look like. Clearly, planning discusses and envisions 
the future. The planning definition that is used in this 
study is that proposed by Wildavsky (1973, p. 128) 
"planning is the attempt to control the future by current 
acts." 
Planning Subcategories Defined 
There are numerous distinctions in types of business 
plans/planning processes. Wood and LaForge (1979) refer to 
comprehensive versus noncomprehensive plans/planning. 
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Thune and House (1970) and Herold (1971) talk about formal 
versus informal plans/planning. Malik and Karger (1975) 
mention integrated versus nonintegrated plans/planning. 
Fulmer and Rue (1974) discuss impoverished, programmed, and 
progressive plans/planning while Kudla (1980) refers to 
non-planners, incomplete planners, and complete planners. 
Fox (1981) writes about formal versus intuitive 
plans/planning. 
Steiner (1979) notes there are essentially two 
fundamentally different ways for a manager to formulate 
plans. He labels the first as "the Mickey Finn approach" 
or what others would call the intuitive, non-integrated, or 
informal approach. Steiner (1979, p. 9) further states, 
perhaps too strongly, that "if an organization is managed 
by intuitive geniuses there is no need for formal strategic 
planning". By this, he means if everyone in a position of 
control in the firm can accurately anticipate the future 
related to the business of the organization, then there is 
no need to plan formally for that future. Steiner feels 
informal, anticipatory-intuitive planning is generally 
based on the past experiences, gut feelings, judgement, and 
reflective thinking of one person. Informal planning tends 
to be based on short time horizons and usually does not 
result in written plans. On the other hand formal planning 
is usually characterized by group interaction, long time 
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frames, past extrapolation data and futurist forecasts, 
specific organizational (not personal) objectives, and a 
means for monitoring final planning decisions. Formal 
planning is usually written. 
While this dichotomy in planning/plans seems quite 
distinguishable, it is necessary to note that most business 
policy and strategy authors of either empirical or 
theoretical material do not define them. The usual 
approach is to define formal planning and leave the reader 
with the job of specifically defining the other extreme. 
Armstrong (1982) points out that we need "a definition to 
distinguish formal from informal planning". Anthony (1965, 
p. 8) also notes that "a distinction should be made between 
formal and informal planning systems"; however, he does not 
offer definitions. While Karger and Malik (1975) 
characterize informal planning as short range, unwritten, 
1-2 year budgets, and general discussion about the future 
among the involved corporate members, their definition 
appears to make a division between functional or business 
level plans and corporate level plans rather than planning 
methods within each planning level. They do not then 
attempt empirical verification of their definition. 
Jones (1978) finds in his survey of corporate chief 
executives that most show a great interest in whether 
planning is effected on a formal or informal basis. At the 
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same time many corporate presidents find the whole process 
of planning rather unnatural and incompatible with their 
normal style of decision-making (Dror, 1975). Rhenman 
(1972, p. 4) even believes that the whole process of formal 
planning is a waste of time stating "strategic planning is 
seldom necessary". 
To restate, if decisions in the present can really 
influence the future of the firm, then the process of 
planning becomes meaningful and the question of when 
informal planning is more appropriate than formal planning 
becomes viable. Once an organization decides in favor of 
planning it will lean toward formal planning processes if 
the top executive is unsure of his/her innate decision¬ 
making abilities. "In a fundamental sense, formal 
strategic planning is an effort to duplicate what goes on 
in the mind of a brilliant, intuitive planner" (Steiner, 
1979, p. 10). However, another view is that formal 
planning is a method for expanding and enhancing the 
executives information base. The stored data and 
experience s/he relies on in refining any final decision. 
Without the formal plans the executive's internal data base 
would be substantially reduced thereby adding increased 
risk to any strategic, corporate-wide decisions. Rhenman 
is overlooking the supplimental value that formal planning 
provides to the top executive. 
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Planning is an activity common to all business 
organizations (Camillas, 1975). Whether this planning is 
informal or formal depends on numerous organizational 
factors. In addition to the organization's members 
predilection for planning or not planning, there are the 
issues of organizational size, organizational business 
activities, organizational structure, and corporate 
expectations. These issues (some would say variables) are 
not discussed here since they are thoroughly presented in 
numerous journal articles (see in particular Fulmer and 
Rue, 1974; Thune and House, 1970; Malik and Karger, 1975; 
Boulton, Franklin, Lindsay and Rue, 1982; Leontiades and 
Tezel, 1980; Lucado, 1974; Armstrong, 1982; Dror, 1975; 
Ramanujam, Venkatraman, and Camillas, 1984; Kudla, 1978; 
Camillas, 1975; Litschert and Nicholson, 1974; Herold, 
1971; Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer, 1980; Kurke and Aldrich, 1979; 
Shrader, Taylor and Dalton, 1984; Kallman and Shapiro, 
1978). Brown (1974) and Eliasson (1976) both indicate that 
much if not most company planning and decision making is 
made outside the formal planning routine. 
Planning and Organizational Financial Performance 
Assuming we believe in our ability to have an impact 
on our future by planning now, what kind of impact will we 
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have? Steiner (1979) has indicated that, except for a very 
few companies, those who don't use formal planning are 
courting disaster. Harold Fox (1981) says that for every 
successful company that uses informal planning there is a 
company floundering for lack of a formal planning system. 
Yet, the controversy continues today over whether or not 
formal planning positively affects a business 
organization's financial performance. A few of the more 
descriptive studies on this question are noted in table 3. 
A more complete list can be found in Armstrong (1982), 
Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton (1984) and Pearce, Freeman, and 
Robinson (1985). It seems that at this point the policy 
and strategy discipline should accept the conclusions of 
Hussey (1984, p. 44): 
...research proves beyond a doubt that 
corporate planning can be beneficial, 
but does not prove it will always be 
beneficial in every case... (p. 44). 
Due to the large number of and the inability to 
operationalize variables related to the issue of planning 
and performance (such as size, corporate age, executive 
age, environmental change, technology), it is unlikely 
solid empirical evidence will ever be uncovered. 
The question of value may be moot when one considers 
the large number of firms that already use formal planning. 
Boulton, Franklin, Lindsay, and Rue (1982) conducted a 
rerun of the Lindsay and Rue (1980) study of who plans and 
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how. They find that there has been a substantial increase 
in the overall number of firms now conducting formal 
planning. Argenti (1976) finds that by the middle of the 
1960*s nearly 75% of all large firms were using formal 
strategic planning methods. It appears that the emphasis 
placed on planning publications and other media has given 
corporate executives reason enough to invest in the 
planning idea. A logical extension of the assumption that 
greater success follows rigorous planning is to assume that 
superior planning systems allow a company to outperform 
competitors with lesser quality systems (see Leontiades and 
Tezel, 1980). No systematic empirical study, as yet, 
attempts to answer carefully which planning systems are 
best, but Bartunek, Gordon, and Weathersby (1983) suggest 
some things to look for (decision-making participation, 
diversified view points, etc.) in judging comprehensive 
programs. As Lucado (1974, p. 33) notes "there has clearly 
been a nominal conversion to the 'dogma* of corporate 
planning". This desire to be included in a potentially 
beneficial movement has caused a stampede to formal 
strategic planning. "Most people appear to pursue 
strategic planning through fear rather than enlightenment" 
(Frederick, 1983, p. 40). As the band wagon gains riders, 
the true value of planning may become less important. When 
nearly everyone is planning, little advantage will be 
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TABLE 3 
STRATEGIC PLANNING EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Studies finding a 
significant positive 
effect on performance 
Studies finding no 
significant effect on the 
organizations performance 
Armstrong, 1982 
Malik and Karger, 1975 
Camillus, 1975 
Herold, 1972 
Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, 
Portner, and Radosevich, 
1970 
Thune and House, 1970 
Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton, 
1984 
Leontiades and Tezel, 1980 
Kudla, 1980 
Kallman and Shapiro, 1978 
Grinyer and Norburn, 1975 
Dror, 1975 
Sheehan, 1975 
Fulmer and Rue, 1974 
Ringbakk, 1971 
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gained by those who plan over the small number of firms who 
are not planning. As long as the planning impact is 
positive, it behooves the corporate president to play it 
safe and follow the corporate wisdom of his/her 
professional peers by continuing to use a formal planning 
process. 
Other Values of Formal Planning 
Aside from the issue of financial performance a few 
authors comment on the value of formal planning from a non- 
financial perspective. Taylor (1976, p. 27) notes that 
planning is most useful when the company faces the issues 
of imminent corporate demise and at other times when 
radical change is essential. Homer, Long, and Pecho (1969, 
p. 173) suggest that the real benefits of formal planning 
are the sharing of work loads, a comprehensive approach to 
corporate thinking, and a stronger ability to cope with 
complex situations. Pearce, Freeman, and Robinson (1985) 
suggest several nonfinancial consequences of formal 
strategic planning (obtained through a review of the 
literature related to formal strategic planning): 
1. enhances ability to identify strategic issues 
2. allows for systematic allocation of 
discretionary resources 
3. provides guidance to subunit managers 
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4. enhances coordination of organizational 
activities 
5. helps generate better strategic alternatives 
6. improves in-house communication 
7. assists in developing good managerial skills 
8. allows faster adaptation to opportunities and 
threats 
9. makes a firm more flexible and adaptable to 
change. 
While the non-planner may argue most of these 
improvements are unnecessary in a properly managed firm, 
the planner argues it can*t hurt to be sure each is 
receiving adequate attention. If one intent of formal 
planning is to provide the firm and, in particular, the CEO 
with "a comprehensive approach to thinking" (Homer, Long, 
and Pecho, 1969, p. 173) or to enhance identifying, 
analyzing, and deciding important corporate issues, then 
the value of formal planning may be highly significant. 
The effect on corporate financial performance will be 
indirect and at times even spurious. However, one study 
(Rue and Fulmer, 1973) finds nonplanners outperform 
planners in the service industry. This outcome suggests 
that while it may appear reasonable to plan regardless of 
the financial return, in some situations planning may be 
detrimental to the firm 
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The question remains, why plan? The answer seems to 
be in many parts. Some companies feel a need to follow the 
leaders so as not to take a chance on the real value of 
formal planning. Even though the evidence does not support 
a significant link between formal planning and dollar 
earnings or savings, perhaps the intangibles of a more 
efficient and productive internal environment are valuable 
enough in themselves. Jones (1978, p. 81) notes that 
"successful planning is a journey, not a destination. It 
is the chastening process of planning which is so 
valuable". Others suggest that it is the planning process 
itself that is useful and important, not the financial 
results after the plans are implemented (Ringbakk, 1971; 
Lorange, 1980). The recent literature review by Pearce, 
Freeman, and Robinson (1985) strongly suggests this last 
possibility. Wildavsky (1973, p. 129) agrees with this 
reasoning saying "achievement and not the plan must be the 
final arbiter of planning". 
The Planning Pendulum 
A phenomenon that has received little attention in the 
literature is the pendulous nature of establishing a formal 
strategic planning system. It appears that as a company 
gains experience with the formal system, there is a desire 
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to return to less formal methods. One article notes that 
"among our sample the cry for greater informality was 
(heard from) companies with a longer experience of 
corporate planning" (Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer, 1980 , p. 33). 
Lorange and Vancil (1977) note in their text that the 
formality of planning is tightened in the early years of 
the system, and becomes less formal and more loose once the 
discipline of planning is widely accepted by the line 
managers. This apparent movement back and forth between 
the informal and formal dichotomies of planning may be one 
of the reasons numerous companies appear to be forsaking 
their highly structured planning systems. If the movement 
by a majority of firms to the formal planning mode took 
roughly ten years (1964-74, see Lucado, 1974) and there is 
now a swing away from formal planning perhaps the pendulum 
has gone full arc. While formal planning may not, 
significantly enhance a firm’s financial performance, there 
is some impact on its well being. Perhaps this impact is 
be the same under informal planning processes. The field 
of strategic management, until this time, has made few 
attempts to test the values and uses of informal planning. 
The Triad in Planning Modes 
Mintzberg (1973) and Pondy (1983) are two of several 
authors in the field propose a triad of theories related to 
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strategic planning rather than a dichotomy as heretofore 
depicted. Mintzberg breaks planning into three modes - the 
entrepreneurial, the traditional, and the formal planning 
approach. Pondy (1983) still uses a dichotomy in his 
thinking but combines the rational (formal) planner and the 
intuitive (informal) planner into one other which he 
contends matches the efforts of Quinn (1980). Quinn's 
approach follows Mintzberg's "traditional muddler" concept. 
Some of the authors previously discussed do suggest that a 
combination of both the informal and the formal systems is 
necessary for corporate success. Lorange (1980) says there 
is no substitute for a lack of intuitive "savvy" on the 
part of the manager. Mintzberg states that 
...all intuitive thinking must be translated 
into the linear order of the left (side of 
the brain) if it is to be articulated and 
eventually used... (1976, p. 57). 
Steiner (1979, p. 10) says that limited empirical 
observations, if undertaken, show that the two approaches 
(intuitive and systematic planning) are indeed meshed 
together in many organizations. They can and should 
complement one another". It seems that while there may be 
more than two ways to "parse" (Weick, 1977, p. 276) the 
data on planning (decision making processes), the extremes 
on that line of thinking will include intuitive/ informal 
on one end and rational/formal on the other. It is useful 
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to think that this dichotomy is a fluid line between the 
two extremes (a continuum), and that time, organizational 
size, executive ontological beliefs, organizational 
planning maturity, and so forth all have a weighting value 
on the pendulum which causes the organization to appear to 
be functioning on one side or the other or even somewhere 
in the middle. 
Planning itself can be viewed from at least two modes 
the intuitive/informal and the rational/formal modes. 
Nearly all business organizations start in the intuitive - 
informal mode, for, "by definition, one does not design an 
informal system" (Anthony, 1965, p. 8), it is just there 
through human interaction. Once a company reaches a 
certain level of growth, which varies with each individual 
company, a trend toward formal planning systems is likely. 
The corporation may go too far in its initial development 
of formal plans and the planning system which may then 
result in a return to a more relaxed informal atmosphere. 
The likelihood of this has not been adequately examined by 
the authorities in the field. 
There appears to be a movement toward an integration 
of the analytical, intellectual, formal processes in 
planning and the behavioral, intuitive, informal processes 
(see Fahey, 1981). As Fahey notes (1981, p. 43) "the 
unifying theme of this movement is that the ‘technical' or 
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'analytical' rubric of strategy (planning) formulation is 
not sufficient to describe and explain the process of 
strategic decision making." It seems formal planning is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, method for assisting in the 
strategic top management decision-making processes. 
If formal planning is necessary but not sufficient, 
what needs to be added? The formal planning process is a 
rational endeavor that assumes the quantiflability of data 
related to the organization. This approach must be 
subjected to refinement through the inclusion of 
diversified views. Whether those views are simply other 
"type III" views of the same problem or strictly 
unconscious, intuitive, feelings does not matter as long as 
they receive a just hearing. As has been noted earlier, 
the end result will likely be more of an intuitive decision 
than a rational one; but, at least, the process will be 
"complicated" enough so that a variety of theories will 
have had a chance to influence the top executive. One 
process that seems to encompass a complicated decision 
making methodology is that used by U.S. supreme court (see 
Woodward and Armstrong, 1979) which relies on majority and 
dissenting reports to arrive at a final decision. Halal 
(1984, p. 247) notes that corporate decisions "are not 
rational or objective in the ordinary sense, but involve a 
very personal and intuitive form of thinking." This 
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difference is due primarily to their ill-structured form 
(Mintzberg, et al., 1975). Because formal plans are very 
structured and attempt to define clearly the problems with 
which they intend to deal, their use at the top in decision 
making will naturally be quite limited. They are useful 
only as organizing and chunking tools, not as answer boxes 
for the ill-structured problems. 
One result of the uniting of formal and informal 
planning systems is, of course, a decision and hopefully a 
better decision than would have been possible if only one 
or the other process had been used alone. A second result 
is organizational learning. The purpose of decision making 
is not only to maintain the organization but also to 
increase its vitality in the future. To develop negative 
entropy (March and Simon, 1958). An organization will not 
continue to make such forward progress unless it learns 
from its past decisions. As Friedlander (1983, p. 194) 
notes "learning is the process, change is the outcome." 
This change may be as simple as accepting the past 
decisions as viable for use in the future or as complex as 
organizational learning through individual member insights 
that leads to new modes of operation. This latter process 
is what Jelinek (1981) refers to as the organization 
learning to learn. Organizational vitality is 
substantially reduced if only rational or intuitive 
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processes are used. In combination, however, success is 
likely. A plan is only a snapshot in time, and time stands 
still for no one. That is why formal plans must be coupled 
with the intuiting abilities of the top executive. 
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The Role of the Top Executive in Decision Making 
Before the world of the corporate executive is 
discussed, it is helpful to remember a comment by David 
Lilienthal: 
...Management does not really exist. 
It is a word, an idea. Like science, 
like government, like engineering, 
management is an abstraction. But 
managers exist. And managers are not 
abstractions; they are men (or 
women). They are human beings. 
Particular and special kinds of human 
beings. Individuals with a special 
function: to lead and move and bring 
out the latest capabilities - and 
dreams - of other human beings. It 
is important that we describe and 
identify these human beings, these 
managers. This we can do only by 
recognizing the nature of the demands 
made upon them as leaders, the 
pressures they are subjected to by 
their tasks of leadership of other 
men. The managerial life is the 
broadest, the most demanding, by all 
odds the most comprehensive and the 
most subtle of all human activities. 
And the most crucial... (1967, p. 18). 
Definitions 
Webster's Dictionary defines chief as of the greatest 
importance, highest rank, or greatest influence. Barnard 
(1938, p. 215) suggests, but never clearly defines, that 
executive means the person who does the specialized work of 
maintaining the organization. He goes on to suggest this 
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means maintaining systems of cooperative effort. Mintzberg 
(1973, p. 99) defines a top manager as "in charge of the 
formal organization." Donaldson and Lorsch (1983, p. 12) 
use the term "corporate manager" in referring to the senior 
executives in the companies regardless of their specific 
titles. They add that "typically the chief executive 
officer (CEO) heads this group (of corporate managers)." 
The senior executives have a variety of titles including - 
president, vice-chairman, executive vice-president, chief 
financial officer, etc. However, the corporate executives 
are the people who make the final decisions. 
Hotter (1982, p. 23-24) notes that before World War I 
there was only one type of general manager in the U.S. - a 
chief executive officer. He further notes that in the past 
forty years new and different kinds of general manager jobs 
have emerged - the functional CEO, the multi-divisional 
CEO, the group General Manager, the divisional General 
Manager, and so forth. In essence. Hotter suggests at 
least one new layer of management has been added to the 
typical business chart. This does not mean, however, that 
the CEO or top executive position is extinct. 
Drucker (1966, p. 5) says that the knowledge worker in 
a modern organization is an "executive" if "by virtue of 
his position or knowledge, he is responsible for a 
contribution that materially affects the capacity of the 
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organization to perform and to obtain results. He adds 
that most managers are executives, but certainly not all. 
A chief executive officer is then simply that person 
who shoulders the final responsibility for maintaining the 
results orientation of the corporation. Unless (s)he is 
over-ruled by the corporation board of directors, the top 
executive has the final say on all corporate decisions. 
(S)he is the, not a, leader of the business entity. 
What is the Ceo Job? 
Mintzberg (1973, p. 8) notes that much material on the 
manager as a leader and on the manager as a decision-maker 
has been published, but seldom are these two areas brought 
together in a comprehensive view of the top executive's 
job. As Lewis and Stewart say: 
...we know more about the motives, habits, 
and most intimate arcana of the primitive 
peoples of New Guinea or elsewhere, than we 
do of the denizens of the executive suites in 
Unilever House... (1958, p. 17). 
Knowledge of what the CEO is supposed to do is extremely 
complete thanks to the seminal works of authors such as 
Fayol (1949) and Barnard (1938). However, the base of 
knowledge for understanding what the corporate president 
does and how s/he does it is quite limited. 
Wrapp (1967), Mintzberg (1973), Quinn (1980) and more 
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recently Kotter (1982) add immensely to that base. Wrapp 
lists five skills that the successful CEO possesses; 
1 . keeps himself informed on a wide range of issues 
2. saves his health and energy for important issues 
3. is sensitive to organizational power struggles 
4. provides the firm with a sense of direction 
5. effectively uses an incremental approach. 
Mintzberg (1973, p. 92-93) adds to this list by providing a 
description of ten top executive roles: 
Interpersonal Role: figurehead, leader, liaison 
Informational Role: monitor, disseminator, spokesman 
Decisional Role: entrepreneur, disturbance handler, 
resource allocator, negotiator. 
Shapira and Dunbar (1980, p. 90) find Mintzberg's ten 
roles can be regrouped into the two primary categories of 
"information generation and processing" and "decision 
making," Quinn (1980) describes how the truly effective 
top executive uses logical incrementalism in his/her job of 
controlling the organization. Kotter (1982) states that 
CEO behavior is hard to reconcile with our traditional view 
of what top managers do. Their actual daily behavior does 
not easily fit Fayol's (1946) five functions of planning, 
organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. 
McCall, et.al. (1978), provide some interesting points 
about what a corporate president does based on a summary of 
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the empirical studies conducted up to 1978: 
1. CEO's spend only 2-5% of their time on planning 
activities. 
2. The major job of the CEO is to gather information. 
3. CEO's spend only 8-13% of their time making 
decisions (Mintzberg (1973) found 21% of CEO time 
was spent on decision making). 
Other points that are made concerning the job of a top 
executive include that (s)he performs great quantities of 
work, prefers current issues over past or recurring issues, 
and receives more information than (s)he sends (Allan, 
1981; Hannan, 1978; Hotter, 1982; Kurke and Aldrich, 1983; 
Mintzberg, 1973; Shapira and Dunbar, 1980). 
Mintzberg (1973) suggests the job of the top executive 
is characterized by extreme brevity in his/her daily 
activities. Kurke and Aldrich (1983) in a replication of 
Mintzberg's original study finds this same characteristic 
but adds that the more dynamic the industrial environment 
(rapidly changing) of the firm, the more varied and 
fragmented (and brief) the work of the CEO. The top 
executive in such situations prefers live action and verbal 
media to subdued thinking and formal written documents. 
Allan's (1981) study of New York City government also 
confirms Mintzberg's conclusions concerning brevity of 
daily activities, the desire for verbal media, and the 
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similarity of tasks for top managers in various 
organizations. He does find a discrepancy with Mintzberg's 
contention that the figurehead role is a part of the top 
executive's job. 
CEO Traits and Demographics 
In addition to the material on the CEO job 
characteristics, there is a substantial body of knowledge 
on the top executive as a human being. This information is 
usually presented either as autobiographical or 
biographical writings such as ^ Years At General Motors 
(Sloan, 1963), Managing (Geneen and Moscow, 1984) or 
lacocca; An Autobiography (lacocca and Novak, 1984) or as 
psychological/sociological studies (Whyte, 1956; Argyris, 
1957; Homans, 1950; Cummins, 1967). Whyte (1956) describes 
the successful executive as someone who is concerned with 
"getting ahead" and not just "fitting in." He refers to 
this aggressive drive as "the executive neurosis." Cummins 
(1967) adapted the T.A.T. (Thematic Apperception Test) to 
be used in determining the amount of aggressive 
determination a potential corporate president may have. In 
essence, Cummins attempts to validate through 
instrumentation the theories of Whyte. Since then numerous 
attempts have been made to categorize and refine the 
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prominent traits that exemplify the successful CEO. 
Leontiades (1982, p. 58) perhaps best summarizes the 
current thinking when he characterizes the "good manager" 
as "...spatial more than linear, right side (of the brain) 
more than left side, and intuitive rather than 
predictable." He feels this is so because "at the top, a 
chief executive deals at the highest level of abstraction, 
encompassing all the uncertainties of the companies 
individual parts." 
The Hotter (1982) study of 15 CEO*s took a close look 
at the common characteristics among them. Hotter (1982, p. 
35) says "In looking at this group of people, one is at 
first glance struck by the great diversity. They are tall 
and short, young and old, conservative and liberal, mellow 
and stern, northern and southern. They certainly so not 
seem to fit into any simple mold." However, Hotter does 
suggest there are twelve characteristics which are shared 
by the majority: they like power, like achievement, are 
ambitious, are emotionally stable, are very optimistic, are 
of above average intelligence, are moderately strong in 
analytical abilities, are personable, and have very broad 
interests. Additionally, most have strong intuitive 
abilities, are very knowledgeable about their business, and 
have strong cooperative relationships both in-house and 
externally. Fox and Montcalm (1982) note in their survey 
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of banking top executives that the majority (70%) have 
college degrees with their primary major being business 
(71% of those with college degrees), Kotter (1982) found 
all 15 of his CEO's had college degrees and most had 
graduate degrees. Some studies note that once a top 
executive finds his business-industry niche, he stays put. 
Top executives are not as mobile as one would expect. All 
of these patterns appear to be validated through other 
studies (see in particular Harrell, 1961 and Chief 
Executive, December, 1980), 
Planning and the CEO 
It appears that most top executives are strongly in 
favor of planning (see Steiner and Kunin, 1983; Bologna, 
1980); however, as was noted in the earlier section on 
decision making, the intuitive decision process tends to 
override the rational which often finds the top executive 
at odds with the recommendations of the planning unit, 
since one intent of the planning process is to provide a 
rational approach to decision-making (see in particular 
Drucker, 1973, p. 17, 129, and 465-480). A common 
complaint of planners is that if the CEO does not spend 
time in the planning process, it will be a worthless 
endeavor (see Hussey, 1984), Leontiades and Tezel (1980) 
conducted a study to determine if companies with superior 
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planning systems (as judged by CEOs themselves) financially 
outperform those with lesser quality systems. Their 
results indicate that companies with the best planning 
systems had ^ noticeably better results to show for their 
planning effort. In fact, the only reasonable statement 
that can be made about the CEO - planning connection is 
that chief executives who rate planning highly spend more 
time planning (than those who rate planning lower). The 
Leontiades and Tezel (1980) study suggests once again that 
the only link between the CEO, planning, and company 
performance is whether the CEO feels planning is important 
or not. Eastlack and McDonald (1970) find that CEOs of 
high performance companies are more likely to consider 
strategic planning a vital part of their jobs. This study 
does not attempt to say that planning equals higher 
performance, but that successful CEOs seem to favor 
planning functions. This result may be more a function of 
the bandwagon effect in formal planning than of a true top 
executive predilection toward planning (see the planning 
section for further discussion). Godiwalla, Meinhart and 
Warde (1981) find in their survey of nearly 1200 U.S. and 
Canadian CEOs that some prefer an informal/intuitive 
approach to decision making while others prefer a more 
structured and formal approach. Those who prefer a more 
formal approach tend to rely heavily on corporate planning 
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information in making their decisions. Perhaps the most 
interesting part of this finding is that CEOs tend to align 
themselves either on the pro-planning side or on the 
intuitive decision side and rarely as preferring both 
methods together. Eliasson (1976) finds in his analysis of 
numerous business firms that the more important a decision 
seems to be to the corporation's health and well being, the 
more the CEO relies on intuitive, judgmental decision¬ 
making methods. He suggest the advantage of a planning 
system is that it frees the top executive from operational 
decisions (structured problem solving) and allows him/her 
to concentrate on more important problems. Jones' (1978) 
study seems to suggest this when he finds that the majority 
of the CEOs interviewed attach more importance to the 
preparation of plans than to the actual plans themselves. 
Brandt seems to summarize the issue best when he says: 
...By far the oldest and most common way of 
making decisions on a long-term direction 
is to rely on the buried experience and 
judgment (intuition) of the top people, 
those who ultimately call the shots... 
(1981 , p. 36) 
Intuition is not obsolete; and a proper strategic planning 
process can hone it. 
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Cross-Cultural Comparative Management 
The comparative management research between the United 
States and Canada is exhaustive. However, studies 
comparing executive decision making methodologies in the 
two countries are extremely limited in both number and 
scope, Javidan (1982) studies the formal planning systems 
in both countries as they relate to the corporate chief 
executive, the planning department manager, and corporate 
divisional managers. His conclusions indicate both 
Canadian and U,S, executives, at all three organizational 
levels are dissatisfied with the contributions formal 
planning make to firm performance, Javidan does not find 
significant differences between the executives of the two 
countries on this issue, Godiwalla, Meinhart, and Warde 
(1981) conducted a survey of 1200 chief executives in the 
United States and Canada, Again no significant conclusions 
between the executives of the two countries are documented. 
These researchers do find that in dynamic-complex 
environments the respondent CEOs rely more on formal 
planning systems for decision making than those executives 
operating in rather stable, limited-change environs, 
Dundos (1979) compares the decision making techniques of 
U,S, manufacturers with their subsidiaries in Canada He 
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finds some differences in the parent enterprise. Milman 
(1986) studies the variation between Canadian and U.S. 
executives in their perceptions of the business and its 
environment. 
The general findings of these studies supports the 
contention that the Canadian business executive is more 
constrained and risk-adverse in his/her daily activities 
than a similarly employed individual in the U.S. Lipset 
(1985) suggested that Canadians are more conservative, 
traditional, and elitist than their southern neighbors. 
Milman (1986) notes that market size may be the single most 
valid reason for these differences in business attitudes. 
Other variables related to these differences include kind 
of government support (Milman, 1986), conservative 
attitudes (Blishen, Jones, Naegle, and Porter, 1968), 
psychological dependence on the U.S. and its economy 
(Perry, 1972), economies of scale held in check (Galbraith, 
1971), and risk-adversity in personalities of those in 
authority (Hardin, 1974). 
Recent work by Malcolm (1985) indicates these traits 
may be rapidly changing. He notes that in the past ten 
years Canadian bankers and businessmen have begun to push 
across the border in their determination to expand their 
ultimate market size. Malcolm suggests the "old" Canadian 
restraint is now giving way to aggressive business tactics 
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that have accelerated Canadian control of U.S. assets to 
more than $40 billion (U.S.). If what Malcom suggests is 
true, then Milman's contention, that market size has 
fostered the old Canadian attitudes, may be more fact than 
theory. 
In summary the comparative management research and 
literature focuses on Canadian and U.S. executive 
personalities but no studies examine how the two 
populations differ in the area of decision making. Given 
the possibility that Canadians are, indeed, increasing 
their business activities in the U.S. these differences are 
even more intriguing today than they were even a few years 
ago 
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Summary 
V 
r. 
While the information contained in each of these 
topical parts is voluminous, a review suggests the areas 
are both overlapping and concurrently incomplete. Decision 
theorists discuss intuitive decision making, but none has 
attempted to define it and empirically document it. 
Strategic planners say their formal plans are necessary to 
corporate survival but no studies have been conducted to 
determine when CEOs find formal plans more valuable than 
they find informal plans. Numerous studies describe the 
chief executive decision-making process, but most base 
their findings on data obtained from managers below the top 
level in the organization. Information is available that 
describes how managers from other countries differ in their 
approach to business activity, but no information describes 
how these differences impact the corporate decision making 
process. Finally, numerous authors describe the impact 
executive age, executive education, corporate size, and 
business environment turbulence have on the business, but 
none of these authors describes what impact these 
extraneous variables have on executive choice of decision 
making methods. This research explores these issues 
through appropriate research methods and perhaps. 
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therefore, brings new insights to the strategic management 
field in the area of decision making and strategic 
planning. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Origination and Theorem Development 
This study documents and analyzes the relationship of 
formal and informal planning to the decision-making process 
at the top echelons of American and Canadian business 
organizations. Specifically, it investigates which of 
these two decision-making tools is more likely to be used 
when the choice to be made is impacted by the importance of 
the problem, the risk to the corporation of a wrong choice, 
the top executive's perceived need to lengthen or shorten 
the time period in which the decision must be made, and the 
stability of the external environment in which the 
corporation operates. Additionally, comparisons are made 
between the Canadian and the American top executives 
concerning their grouped responses to these issues. 
The theories relevant to this study are described in 
the preceeding literature review chapter. In particular, 
the work done by Eliasson (1976), Mintzberg, et. al. 
(1976), Kurke and Aldrich (1983), Armstrong (1982), 
Dickerson and Nadeau (1978), Malcolm (1985), and Agor 
(1986) guide the development of the theorems that tollers. 
This chapter first elaborates the theorems and resulting 
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hypotheses that are evaluated in this research and then 
discusses the methodology used either to verify or to 
refute the contentions outlined in these theories. 
The primary objective of the study is to answer the 
following questions: 
1• do corporate top executives rely on and use informal as 
well as formal plans in making important corporate 
decisions? 
2. is there any difference between Canadian and U.S. 
executives in this regard? 
The secondary objective of this study is to determine the 
extent of the validity of theorems one through four. 
The following theorems, taken from the previously 
mentioned literature are used as a basis for the 
hypotheses: 
Theorem : The perceived importance of and type of 
corporate problem, opportunity, or crisis 
makes a difference in the choice of planning 
method used to solve that problem. 
Theorem §2i The need to "buy time" or the urgency of the 
problem, opportunity, or crisis has a bearing 
on which planning method is chosen to make a 
decision about that problem. 
Theorem #3: The uncertainty of the external environment, 
in which the firm operates, has an effect on 
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the planning method chosen to make a decision 
about a corporate problem. 
Theorem §4z The risk to the firm of choosing a correct 
decision has an effect on which planning 
method is chosen to make that decision. 
Theorem §5: Top executives of Canadian corporations are 
more likely to rely on formal plans in making 
their corporate decisions than are U.S. 
executives. 
Operational Definitions 
For the purposes of this research the concepts of 
strategic, important, rational decision-making, intuitive 
decision-making, formal planning, informal planning, 
uncertainty, and risk are defined as follows: 
STRATEGIC: that which is important (vital, crucial) to the 
survivial of the firm as determined by the top executive 
decision-maker in terms of actions taken, resources 
committed, and/or precedents set. 
RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING: the logical, linear, analytical 
scientific process of making important choices in the 
presence of an organizational objective with the intent of 
meeting that objective. 
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INTUITIVE DECISION-MAKING: a relational, unsystematic, 
subjective, perceptive process of making important choices 
in the presence of an organizational objective with the 
intent of meeting that objective. 
FORMAL PLANNING: any explicit process that is exemplified 
by the expenditure of resources and the development of 
written documentation articulating the outcome of current 
decisions (one year or more), the establishment of a 
process(es) to guide and limit these future actions, the 
combination of corporate level plans into a unified whole, 
and the development of systems for monitoring the results. 
INFORMAL PLANNING: any implicit process that is an 
unstructured, undocumented, resource expending, and, yet, 
planned response to business related problems, 
opportunities, or crises. 
TOP EXECUTIVE: the individual who, characteristically, 
plays the dominant role in the process of establishing 
corporate objectives, setting planning horizons, 
determining environmental assumptions, reviewing overall 
progress toward the objectives, as determined by previously 
agreed upon standards, and generally guiding the efforts of 
the corporate entity. 
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UNCERTAINTY; the difference between the information needed 
to perform a task and the information available. The 
degree of instability of the corporate environment is also 
a concern in this survey. 
RISK: knowledge about the probability distribution (the 
odds) of the consequences of a right or wrong decision 
choice, the variability of the possible known outcomes. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have evolved from the five 
theorems and from the literature review found in Chapter 
II. 
Hypothesis : The top executive's preference for using 
"informal plans" to solve corporate 
problems is significantly related to 
his/her perception of the importance 
of those problems (see Eliasson, 1976). 
Hypothesis §2: The top executive's perceived need to "buy 
time" for later, more permanent decision 
making is significantly related to his/her 
preference for "informal plans" in making 
present time corporate decisions (see 
Mintzberg, et al., 1976). 
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Hypothesis #3: The top executives' preference for using 
"formal plans" in corporate decision 
making is significantly related to the 
instability and uncertainty of the 
business environment in which the firm 
operates (see Armstrong, 1982 and Kurke & 
Aldrich, 1983). 
Hypothesis The top executive's preference for "formal 
plans" in making a corporate decision is 
significantly related to the risk to the 
firm of a wrong decision (see Armstrong, 
1 982) . 
Hypothesis ^5: The top executives of Canadian 
corporations are significantly more likely 
to use "formal plans" in their corporate 
decision making than are top executives of 
U.S. corporations (Dickerson & Nadeau, 
1 978) . 
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Confounding Variables 
The demographic variables of organizational size, 
business sector operations, executive age, executive 
education, and executive years with the firm are all noted 
in previous strategic management research as variables that 
may impact the investigation of executive preferences and 
beliefs in business organizations. In this study, 
demographic information is used to analyze the impact all 
the above variables may have on the issues of 
formal/informal planning and rational/intuitive decision 
making. For example, some earlier research differentiates 
planning styles by corporate size (Galbraith, 1979) and 
industry type (Litschert and Nicholson, 1974; Karger and 
Malik, 1975; Kudla, 1980; Thune and House, 1970; Wood and 
Laforge, 1981; Fulmer and Rue, 1973). This study will 
employ statistical control techniques to analyze the 
differences between U.S. and Canadian survey respondents. 
The Study Sample 
The Sample Defined 
The purpose of this study is to identify relationships 
or associations that may exist among and between sets of 
observations. Since the complete population of corporate 
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top executives in American and Canadian businesses of all 
sizes numbers in the hundreds of thousands, this study uses 
sampling procedures in an effort to define a subset or 
portion of that population. 
The population from which the sample is drawn consists 
of large, medium, and small companies. Defining the size 
variable as related to business corporations is a difficult 
and inexact process. Forbes magazine (November 4, 1985) in 
its article on the "200 best small companies in America" 
define small as having gross sales of between $1.0 million 
and $300.0 million per year. The U.S. Small Business 
Administration uses three general criteria -- number of 
employees (less than 500 full time employees), related 
industry groups, and volume of dollar sales per year - to 
define a small business. Robinson (1982) defines small 
business as employing less than 50 people and/or having 
less than $3.0 million in annual sales. Grollman and Colby 
(1978) prefer to define small as a company having only one 
to three key management people (Woodward, 1958, also 
developed extensive empirical evidence suggesting the 
number of employees on the corporate management team is the 
best indicator of corporate size). Broom (1983) says a 
small company is any company with less than one hundred 
employees. The U.S. Department of Commerce suggests under 
500 full time employees as the appropriate cutoff point. 
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Generally, most organizational theorists use the 
number of employees as the factor that determines size, as 
that measure is likely to be less affected by such 
variables as inflation or other economic factors impacting 
the firm (see in particular Chandler, 1962; Hall, 1977; 
Rushing, 1965; Blau, 1970; and Lawerence and Lorsch, 1967). 
For the purposes of this study and to avoid developing 
complicated procedures for adjusting the fluctuating 
exchange rate between the U.S. and Canada, this study uses 
the number of full time employees as the determinant for 
organizational size. The cutoff of five hundred full-time 
employees is the predetermined break between small and 
medium firms; two thousand is the break between medium and 
large firms. 
The intent of this study is to investigate the uses of 
both formal and informal planning; therefore, the sample 
must contain those firms who use or have the potential for 
using both types of planning. Some empirical studies 
indicate that small firms do not usually have access to the 
size of financial resources that are required to establish 
effective formal planning systems (see in particular 
Armstrong, 1982; Curtis, 1983; VanKirk and Noonan, 1982; 
Sexton and Van Auken, 1982; Robinson, 1982); therefore, 
companies of less than one hundred and fifty employees are 
not used. Firms of less than one hundred and fifty full 
86 
time employees are assumed to be either emerging firms 
whose executives have not, yet established their decision¬ 
making styles or unsophisticated firms that remain too 
small to experience the type of decision-making and formal 
planning discussed in this study. 
The Sample Frame 
The sampling frame is Standards and Poors' Register of 
Corporate, Directors, and Executives, Volume £1_, the 
corporation lists, and Dun and Bradstreet's Canadian 
Business Directory, Volumes 1 and II. While these lists 
are not completely comprehensive, they are reasonably 
inclusive. Ideally, a copy of these two references can be 
computerized, each appropriate firm numbered, and a 
computerized number generator used to select each sample 
firm. However, since these references contain both parent 
corporations and their subsidiaries, small, medium, and 
large firms, and listings that number in excess of four 
hundred thousand, this method of selection is prohibitive 
in both time and costs for a study of this kind. 
A variation on the simple random sample techniques was 
used to adequately obtain an appropriate sample. This 
variation includes conducting a pilot study of both U.S. 
and Canadian companies in an effort to ascertain 
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realistically the likely response rates. The results of 
the pilot study were used both to validate the 
questionnaire and to develop simple statistics for use in 
determining the appropriate sample size requirements for 
the various scaled variables, SIC categories, and U.S. to 
Canadian comparisons. 
The pilot survey indicated that the overall response 
rate was greater than twenty-eight percent; therefore, a 
sample of four hundred Canadian and four hundred American 
executives (see Levy and Lemeshow, 1980, p. 128) is 
believed to be adequate to provide for rigorous sampling 
and yet meet cost and manpower constraints. The following 
section charts the random selection process used for both 
the U.S. and Canadian groups. 
The U.S. Sample; 
- the number of pages in the Register of Corporate ^ 
Directors, and Executives, 1985, volume = 2682 
- the average number of companies per page =17 
- the average number of excluded small companies per page 
= 6 
- the average number of usable companies per page =11 
- the total number of companies in the book = 45,000 of 
which approximately 15,347 are excluded small companies. 
- the total approximate number of usable companies = 29,650 
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- the SIC classifications used will be as follows: 
1. Industrial =0111 to 5999 
2. Financial = 6011 to 6999 
3. Service = 7011 to 8999 
Group sample size *paqe chunk **Description 
Industrial 1 50 / 2682 17.9 one every 1 8 pages 
Financial 125 / 2682 21 .5 one every 22 pages 
Service 1 25 / 2682 21 .5 one every 22 pages 
The Canadian Sample; 
- the number of pages in the Dun and Bradstreet Canadian 
Key Business Directory, 1986, volumes I and II = 529 
- the average number of companies per page = 28 
- the average number of excluded small companies per page 
= 10 
- the average number of usable companies per page =18 
- the total number of companies in the book = 14,800 of 
which approximately 5,180 are excluded small companies. 
- the total approximate number of usable companies = 
9,620. 
- the SIC classifications used will be as follows: 
1. Industrial =0111 to 5999 
2. Financial = 6011 to 6999 
3. Service = 7011 to 8999 
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Group sample size *paqe chunk **Description 
Industrial 1 50 / 529 3.5 one every 4 pages 
Financial 1 25 / 529 4.2 one every 4 pages 
Service 1 25 / 529 4.2 one every 4 pages 
* Use a four-digit or three-digit random number list to 
determine the starting point. 
** If there is more than one firm of that group on the 
page, then use a two-digit random number list to select one 
from among them. If no firms are on that page go on to the 
next page chunk. 
The Research Instrument 
Data on top executive decision making came from 
responses to a mailed questionnaire. There is extensive 
debate in the field of strategic management concerning the 
reliability and validity of information about executive 
preferences and thinking obtained through mailed 
instruments. This method of data collection was chosen 
because of two relevant concerns about the top executive 
population and this study: 
1. Top executives in business enterprises are notoriously 
difficult to reach for research purposes because their time 
on the job is protected and, to a certain extent, 
controlled by the authority of their secretaries and 
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assistants. These individuals are commonly referred to in 
management literature as the "gate keepers". 
2. The interest in this research is not to develop a model 
of how a few executives make their decisions (see 
Mintzberg, et al., 1976), but rather to explore the value 
top executives place on informal/formal plans for making 
decisions. 
Given these two concerns, a mailed questionnaire coupled 
with follow-up interviews seems the appropriate method for 
gathering data to use in testing the hypotheses. 
As noted above, the study surveys the top executive in 
the firm. This individual's title varies widely throughout 
the U.S. and Canada. The top executive is also commonly 
referred to as the corporate "chief executive officer" 
(CEO). In selecting the random sample, the expected 
recipient of the survey instrument was the name at the top 
of the list of company corporate officers. 
The questionnaire is developed through a deductive 
process of reviewing prior, related research, developing 
hypotheses of interest, and drawing it all together in a 
five-part survey instrument. A panel of seven academic 
researchers reviewed and critiqued the closed-answer 
questions and suggested critical modifications both 
regarding question wording and instrument design. Then the 
revised questionnaire was administered in a semi-structured 
91 
interview format to a group of five corporate chief 
executive officers drawn from a convenience sample in the 
local area. These executives clarified definitions, 
eliminated inappropriate questions, added new insights that 
suggested new questions, and generally critiqued the draft 
instrument from a top executive perspective. The final 
revised questionnaire, as displayed in the appendix of this 
manuscript, was again administered to a different 
convenience sample of five executives who provided a final 
critique and established a thiry minute response time for 
completion of the questions. 
As noted earlier, formal and informal planning can be 
viewed as extremes on a continuum. The questions in the 
survey instrument that relate to this continuum form three 
primary categories: formal plans, informal plans, and a 
mixture of formal and informal plans. Those questions in 
the survey that relate specifically to one end of the 
continuum or the other are as follows: 
Formal Plans: (the left end of each of the following 
question response lines). 
Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 
22-26, 29, 30, 31, 35-38. 
Informal Plans: (the right end of each of the following 
question response lines). 
Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 18-31, 35-39. 
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Both Types of Plans: (the middle point of the lines). 
Questions 1-3, 5-7, 10-11, 15, 18-31, 
35-39. 
Demographic questions are used as the control over 
potentially confounding variables related to the issues of 
formal/informal plans and rational/intuitive decision¬ 
making. 
A literature search conducted in an effort to locate 
other instruments for use in this research found none; 
therefore, this instrument was developed and pre-tested in 
a pilot study of 140 U.S. and Canadian firms. The test 
conducted during January and February, 1986, had a response 
rate of 28.7%. No unexpected or deviant results were 
noted. Fowler (1984, p.147) notes that with mailed 
questionnaires early returns are particularly biased 
samples when compared to later returns. This problem was 
particularly evident in the pilot study and was, therefore, 
carefully examined in the later survey. 
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Data Collection, Procedures, and Processing 
Techniques for Increasing Response Rates 
In an effort to obtain as large a return from CEOs as 
possible, numerous methods for increasing the response rate 
were employed. Extensive work by some researchers (see in 
particular Heberlein and Baumbartner (1978), Alwin, ed. 
(1977), Armstrong (1975), Bachrack and Scoble (1967), Boek 
and Lade (1963), and Dillman (1978)) provides several 
useful procedures that appear to increase dramatically the 
overall response rate and thereby reduce the non-response 
problem. Some of these major points, especially those that 
have an impact on this study, include the following: 
1. Establishment of realistic cut-off dates and 
inclusion of that information in the questionnaire 
packet improves the return rate. 
2. Inclusion of a prepaid envelope for the return of 
responses improves the return rate. 
3. A first follow-up mailing nets approximately an 
additional 20% of the initial return, a second follow-up 
nets approximately an additional 12% of the initial return; 
and a third about 10%. 
4. A regular hand-stamped envelope produces a better return 
result than a business reply envelope. 
5. Both the survey title and the opening paragraph of the 
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cover letter can affect response rates by as much as 20%. 
6. A multilith or printed questionnaire produces 
substantially better results than a photocopy instrument. 
7. Questionnaires receive better responses when they are 
mailed first class. 
8. If confidentiality and anonymity are a concern, enclose 
a postcard that can be returned separately to indicate that 
the respondent's name should be removed from the non¬ 
response list. 
9. Rank order and open-ended questions should be avoided. 
10. Questionnaires that require more than one-half hour to 
complete should be avoided. 
11. A diagram or pictorial on the questionnaire cover will 
increase the return rate. 
All of the above techniques were used in this survey 
with two exceptions: 
1. the cover letter of the pilot survey requested a twelve- 
day cutoff date. However, mail delivery and return in 
Canada exceeds sixteen days, therefore, the cutoff date had 
the effect of potentially reducing, instead of increasing, 
returns from Canadian executives. Because of this problem, 
no cutoff date is used in the final survey cover letter. 
2. Because of the costs associated with a printed 
instrument, the final instrument was reproduced via a high 
quality photocopy process. 
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While these procedures help maintain a high response 
rate and, therefore, reduce the sources of error due to 
nonresponse, a very high (e.g. over 35%) response rate from 
top executives is not likely. 
Dillman (1978) suggests a seventy percent or better 
response rate from a mailed questionnaire can be expected 
if these suggestions are followed. A review of recent 
business executive surveys indicates that a realistic 
response rate for this type of study is about twenty-seven 
percent. The following are four reviews of such surveys; 
1. Miller (1975) received a 27% return rate in three 
mailings to Boston metropolitan top business executives. 
2. Milman (1985) received a 15% return rate in one mailing 
to Canadian top business executives. 
3. Agor (1985) received a 35% return rate in three mailings 
to U.S. top and middle level business executives. 
4. Carlisle and Michael (1984-85) received a 29% return 
rate in three mailings to U.S. and Canadian top business 
executives. 
The question of anonymity is of concern to executives 
of both private and public enterprises therefore, this 
survey maintained the confidentiality of the respondents by 
asking each to return a postcard advising the researcher to 
remove the executive's name from future mailing lists. 
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The Survey Time Frames 
The questionnaires were mailed to the sample 
population according to the following schedule: 
Day z March 21, 1986, the first packets were mailed. 
Day §^0z March 31, 1986, the postcard reminders were 
mailed. 
Day §26i April 17, 1986, the second group of packets were 
mailed. 
Day §73z June 2, 1986, the data collection phase was 
terminated. 
In addition to the questionnaire, the packet mailings 
included a self-addressed, hand-stamped, business envelope, 
a "yes, I have responded" self-addressed and stamped 
postcard, and a cover letter. The reminder postcard 
mailing included a stamped, self-addressed "Yes, I would 
like another questionnaire as I've misplaced mine" postcard 
(see the Appendix). 
Quality Control of Data Entry 
As the questionnaires were returned, they were dated, 
coded, and entered on computer coding sheets. This 
information was then entered manually into a computer data 
file. Previous research by Miller (1983) and Fowler (1984) 
indicates that coding closed-end questions can lead to 
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approximately a 1% error rate in the coding process. Even 
though this potential error rate is rather low, a second 
statistician checked and verified the work of the first. 
No errors in the coding process were detected during this 
procedure. 
The Executive Interviews 
After the survey data was collected and analyzed, 
three corporate presidents who indicated on the return 
postcards an interest in being interviewed were randomly 
selected from both the Canadian and the U.S. mailing lists. 
An interview visit was subsequently arranged with each of 
these participants. The intent of these on-site visits was 
to verify or refute the findings of the questionnaire 
survey. Jick (1979: 603) refers to this process as 
"triangulation" or multiple view points that allow for 
greater accuracy. The expected result is a research study 
that has counterbalanced its weaknesses with the strengths 
of another methodology. In the case of this study these 
meetings explained, clarified, and/or documented with hard 
observable facts that information obtained via quantitative 
survey methods. These observations were then summarized as 
to their relationship to the findings of the questionnaire. 
The information obtained via this qualitative methodology 
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helps substantiates that of the survey study. This phase 
of the overall project began on May 8, 1986 and concluded 
on May 14, 1986. 
Using unstructured techniques (Schwartz and Jacobs, 
1979) the interviews were formed around a select number of 
open-ended questions. These questions are roughly 
equivalent to those numbered 1, 4, 8, 14, 21, 25, 30, 31, 
37, 39, 40, 44, and 50 in the questionnaire. 
Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
Statistical Analysis 
The dependent (criterion) variables of interest 
include both formal and informal plans while the 
independent (predictor) variables include such categories 
as decision risk, importance, perceived need to "buy time" 
and the stability of the external environment. These 
independent variables are amalgamations of the following 
survey questions (please refer to the questionnaire in the 
appendix): 
- decision importance = questions 22, 23, and 25. 
- decision riskiness = questions 35, 37. 
- environmental stability = questions 29-31. 
- buying time = questions 24, 26. 
99 
In addition to these primary variables there are several 
other questions within the survey that relate to the 
personal preferences of the CEO from a rational/intuitive 
standpoint. Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 come from the 
literature concerning rational decision making and 
intuitive decision making. It is strongly suggested in the 
literature, although not tested, that a totally rational 
thinker will tend to rely almost exclusively on formal 
planning methods as a tool in decision making, while a 
primarily intuitive thinker will tend to rely on informal 
planning methods as a tool in decision making. The 
responses to these six questions will allow an individual 
to be at least labelled as a thinker that is intuitive, 
rational, or a mixture of both. this rational/formal 
and intuitive/informal theory is true, then there should be 
very high positive correlations in the formal/rational and 
informal/intuitive matchings. 
These major and minor analyses lead to a more 
comprehensive comparison between Canadian and U.S. top 
executives, holding constant the confounding variables 
noted earlier. Basic demographic information as contained 
in the questionnaire will be used to analyze the impact CEO 
education, years with a firm, and CEO age may have on the 
issues of formal/informal planning as methods of decision 
making. 
The nonparametric tests appropriate to this study 
dependent on assuming the Likert-like scales used in the 
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questionnaire are "ordinal." Thus, the statistics used 
will be median, frequency, chi-square, the Spearman Rank 
Correlation, and so forth. Multi-table chi-square and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z will be used to compare the U.S. and 
Canadian responses (Hypothesis 5). Nonparametric 
evaluation of this type of data requires statistical 
analysis of such concerns as central tendency, dispersion, 
symmetry, and normality. The results of this analysis is 
reported in Chapter IV. 
The Nonrespondent Problem 
There is no known method for eliminating the problem 
of nonresponse by survey members. An extensive effort at 
increasing the response rate by developing a survey program 
that maximizes the likelihood of any particular 
questionnaire recipient's completing and returning the 
instrument, is the best approach to solving the problem. 
Two forms of errors still remain a concern: 
observation errors and non-observation errors. Observation 
errors are likely in that the population from which the 
sample was drawn is not one hundred percent complete; 
therefore, non-coverage is a problem. The likelihood that 
the names and addresses obtained from the sampled source 
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books are erroneous further complicates the non-coverage 
issue. However, it is of marginal concern. Of greater 
concern is trying to determine if a bias exists between 
those who did not respond and those who did. One approach 
to solving this problem is to estimate the sample size 
based on a minimally expected rate of return (please refer 
to the sample selection section of this chapter). Another 
method is simply to report the extent of non-responses and 
assume the response subset is representative of the larger 
non-response set. Survey research finds that non¬ 
respondents often differ substantially from respondents on 
several key variables: education, age, occupational status, 
and income. Three of the above four variables were 
statistically controlled during the analysis phase, while 
the fourth, income, is deemed too threatening to top 
executives to be included and was, therefore, excluded. 
However, respondents and nonrespondents are compared on the 
variables of executive age, organizational size, SIC codes, 
environmental turbulence, and sales. Ignoring these 
differences among potential non-respondents seriously 
compromises this study. In addition, an examination of 
non-respondents was carried out via a telephone survey 
conducted during the week of May 25, 1986, near the end of 
the questionnaire phase. The intent of this follow-up 
procedure is to ascertain how non-respondents who are 
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willing to discuss the survey over the telephone might 
differ from respondents. Such telephone surveys are not 
similar enough to mail surveys to allow direct comparisons 
largely because of self-selection and interpretation 
problems. Also time analysis studies indicate that any 
such validity check must be conducted as soon as possible 
after the completion of the mailed phase so as to reduce 
selection, maturation, and mortality validity problems 
(Campbell and Stanley, 1963). In spite of these efforts, 
direct population parameter generalizations cannot be made. 
However, such an exploration is useful for future research 
studies. 
Validity and Reliability 
One of the significant drawbacks to correlational 
research is the difficulty of adequately validating the 
procedures and instruments used. The instrument to be used 
in this study is new and untested which dramatically 
escalates the validity problem. Numerous authors 
castigate correlational ex post facto research (see in 
particular Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell, 
1979; Kerlinger, 1973). However, most of these concerns 
relate to the lack of validity and reliability checks done 
on previously conducted correlational studies. Therefore, 
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this study employs an extensive program aimed at clearly 
documenting its validity. The following categories are of 
major concern in this study: 
Content validity: A seven member academic and a five 
member executive panel was used in the earlier stages of 
the questionnaire development to review and validate the 
content of each question. 
Construct validity: An attempt at providing construct 
validity can best be accomplished by statistical techniques 
that hold out such intervening variables as age, education, 
type of industry, etc. In addition, method variance can be 
reasonably controlled via a thorough literature review to 
determine previously documented knowledge. The use of 
several different questions asking for the same data helps 
verify the proposed constructs. As can be noted in the 
questionnaire, some similar questions use different 
response scales which also allows for method validity 
checks (see questions 24 & 26 and questions 21 & 38). The 
extensive double pretest procedure eliminates most format, 
item content, and general instruction problems that might 
lead to construct validity problems. Convergent validity 
was checked through the use of factor analysis of the 
informal/formal dichotomy. 
Statistical conclusion validity: The yerification of 
type I and type II errors in correlational research is 
extremely important. The internal consistency of the test 
items is tested using Chombach's Alpha. Although opinion 
varies on standards of reliability Nunnally (1967) suggests 
that in the early stages of research reliabilities in 
excess of .50 are acceptable for a new instrument, although 
reliabilities approaching .80 are preferable. Coefficient 
Alpha for the items in this survey ranged from .701 to .861 
(see Table 4). Also inter-item correlations were 
appropriately high. In addition, the conclusions are 
useful only if the sample adequately resembles the 
population. Therefore, a telephone survey of a random 
sample of the non-respondents was conducted and a 
comparison of the demographic characteristics of the 
respondent firms to the nonrespondent firms was used to 
ascertain whether or not the two groups are in fact 
similar. 
External validity; This problem was controlled 
through the careful selection of the sample group. In 
addition, the survey and analysis of the non-respondents 
further reduces external validity concerns. 
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TABLE 4 
INSTRUMENT RELIABILITY 
Variable Group Hypothesis § Alpha Value 
Q22,Q23,Q25 1 .86088 
Q27,Q28,Q29,Q30 3 .70144 
Q20,Q21,Q25 5 .82627 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the study, in 
three parts. The first section discusses the general 
profile of the executives who responded to the survey. The 
second section uses the questionniare data to document and 
discuss the hypotheses tested. A third section reviews 
potential problems with the validity of the findings. 
Following these three sections. Chapter V discusses the 
implications these results have for the field of strategic 
management. 
Part 1 -- The Respondent Profile 
The Response Rates 
A total of 324 returns were received from a mailing of 
800 questionnaires. Of these 324 responses, 69 were 
undeliverable postal returns and 18 were unanswered 
questionnaires attached to letters from executives who 
declined to participate in the study (see Table 5). This 
leaves a total of 237 usable questionniare returns. The 
overall return rate is 29.6% while the return rate to 
deliverable mailings is 33.2% (see Table 6). 
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TABLE 5 
DELIVERED, UNDELIVERED, AND REFUSED QUESTIONNAIRES 
Deliverable Mail: Total - Undeliverable^ = Total 
USA 391 20 = 366 
Canada 391 44 = 347 
Total 782 69 713 
Recipient Refusals^^ 
USA 9 
Canada 9 
Total 18 
♦Returned, unopened, by the respective postal authority. A 
random telephone check revealed numerous reasons for these 
returns from corporate bankruptcy to the death of the 
addressee. 
♦♦These targeted executives returned the blank 
questionniares with an explanation that company policy, 
personal policy, or time constraints prevented them from 
participating. 
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TABLE 6 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
Country/Sector Sent Out Returned Return Rate 
USA: 
Industrials 1 50 55 36.7% 
Financials 125 41 32.8 
Service 1 25 41 32.8 
Subtotals 400 1 37 34.8% 
Canada: 
Industrials 150 40 26.7% 
Financials 125 25 20.0 
Service 125 35 28.0 
Subtotals 400 1 00 25.0% 
Grand Total 800 237 29.6% 
Adjusted Response Rate with Undeliverables Deleted* 
Deliverable Returns Return Rate 
USA: 366 1 37 37.4% 
Canada: 347 100 28.8 
Grand Total: 71 3 237 33.2% 
♦Please refer to Table 5 for clarification 
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Sample Corporate Characteristics 
The survey includes three hundred industrial, two 
hundred and fifty financial, and two hundred and fifty 
service companies (see Table 6) with return rates of 36.7%, 
32.8%, and 32.8% respectively for the U.S. and 26.7%, 20%, 
and 28% for the Canadians. Forty per cent of the 
respondents are from the industrial sector, 27.7% from the 
fi^Q^ricial sector, and 32.1% from the service sector. 
The number of full time employees for these respondent 
companies ranges from 40 to 50,000. The average number of 
full time employees for U.S. firms is 1,895 while that of 
the Canadian firms averages 2,388. Fifty-four per cent of 
the respondents have from 40 to 500 (small size firms - see 
pages 84-85 for Clarification) full-time employees; 29.6% 
f^om 500 to 2,000 (medium size firms — see pages 84—85 
for clarification); 11.1% from 2,000 to 10,000 (large size 
firms - see pages 88-89 for clarification); and 3.9% have 
over 10,000 full-time employees (large size firms - see 
pages 84-85). 
Sample Executive Characteristics 
The average U.S. executive responding to this study is 
about 56 years old, has been in his/her position for a bit 
over ten years, has received a college degree, and sits 
behind an office door titled "president." The typical 
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Canadian respondent is 52 years old, has a college degree, 
and also answers to the title of "president." 
Respondents ages ranges from a low of 30 years to a 
high of 87. Years of education range from less than 12 
(6.8%) to over 18 years (15.8%). The degrees received 
include 59 B.A.'s, 8 M.A.'s, 33 M.B.A.'s, 6 Ph.D.'s, and 
others. The major areas of educational or vocational 
interests include business (n=100), engineering (n=38), 
liberal arts (n=22), and law (n=19). As attested in tables 
7 and 8, these respondents have tended to stay with the 
same company (e.g. 71% have worked with fewer than four 
firms and 15% have worked for only one firm during their 
working years.) 
TABLE 7 
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS 
Years of formal education (question 41): 
n median std err. mean std dev 
U.S.A. 1 29 16.294 .252 16.140 2.858 
Canada 93 16.261 .387 15.462 3.729 
Mann Whitney U = 6493 .5 Z = .7070 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 11543 .5 2-tailed prob. = .4796* 
* There are no significant differences between U.S. and 
Canada on this issue at the .05 level of significance. 
Years in present i corporate position (question 45): 
n median std err. mean std dev 
U.S.A. 1 30 10.278 .823 12.246 9.361 
Canada 93 8.600 .971 10.097 9.156 
Mann Whitney U = 5796.5 Z = 2.0857 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 10846.5 2-tailed prob. = .0370* 
* There is a significant difference between U.S. and Canada 
on this issue at the .05 level of significance (i.e. U.S. 
executives have been in their present corporate positions 
longer than their Canadian counterparts). 
TABLE 7 Continued (page 2) 
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS 
1 1 2 
Present age of respondent (question 50): 
n median std err. mean 
U.S.A. 1 33 56.688 .896 55.639 
Canada 97 52.000 .930 51 .186 
Mann Whitney U = 5208 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 10258 2-tailed prob. 
std dev. 
10.338 
9.156 
= 3.2681 
= .0011* 
* There is a significant difference between U.S. and Canada 
on this issue at the .05 level of significance (i.e. the 
U.S. executives in this survey tend to be older than their 
Canadian counterparts). 
The corporate business environment (question 30)**; 
n median std err. mean std dev. 
U.S.A. 1 37 3.392 .082 3.416 .960 
Canada 100 3.226 .107 3.202 1 .069 
Mann Whitney U = 6066 Z = 1 .4420 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 11016 2-tailed prob. = .1493* 
* There is no significant difference between U.S. and 
Canada on this issue at the .05 level of significance. 
** Question 30 asks how the executive would describe the 
firm's business environment using a continuum from stable 
to volatile. See the Appendix). 
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TABLE 7 Continued (page 3) 
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS 
The corporate business environment (question 30): 
n median std err. mean std dev 
Industrial 95 3.230 .105 3.255 .105 
Financial 66 3.611 .110 3.545 .898 
Service 76 3.208 .124 3.224 1 .078 
Mann Whitney U = 6348.5 Z = -.8843 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 12164.5 2-tailed prob. = .3765* 
* There is no significant difference between U.S. and 
Canada on this issue at the .05 level of significance. 
TABLE 8 
RESPONDENT VITAL STATISTICS 
The Primary Job Titles of the Respondents (question 44), 
Country Pres. CEO Chairman • • 
>
 COO Other 
U. S. 52 15 50 4 1 1 5 
Canada 47 5 22 9 1 16 
The Highest Educational Degree Earned by the Respondents 
(question 42). 
Country HS BA BS MA MS MBA PhD Other 
U. S. 7 36 28 2 5 18 4 37 
Canada 4 23 10 6 8 15 2 32 
The Major Area of Educational or Vocational Training 
(question 43). 
Country Bus Sci Law Lib Art Econ Engeer Other 
U. S. 58 4 13 15 6 21 20 
Canada 42 3 6 7 1 17 24 
11 5 
Part II — Hypothesis Testing 
This section presents the five major hypotheses and 
draws test conclusions. These hypotheses have been 
previously presented in Chapter III but are now discussed 
individually. 
In order to avoid false assumptions about this 
population of executives, distribution-free or 
nonparametric techniques are used to analyze the data 
related to these hypotheses (see Chapter III for further 
clarification). The instrument items are generally ordinal 
in design and utilize a Likert-like response line. 
Results of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis £1_: The top executive's preference for 
using informal plans to solve corporate problems is 
significantly related to his/her perception of the 
importance of those problems (see Eliasson, 1976). 
This hypothesis, as proposed by Eliasson, assumes that 
an extremely important corporate problem will require the 
use of informal plans to solve it. Perhaps the decision 
must be made quickly or the executive feels, since (s)he 
will be credited with either a right or a wrong choice, 
(s)he is safest relying on personal experience and 
knowledge rather than formal approaches. The instrument 
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questions (see the Appendix) related to this hypothesis are 
22, 23, and 25. Each of these questions relates the 
concept of importance to the choice of formal or informal 
plans. Question twenty-five substitutes the word strategic 
for important. The intent in this substitution is two¬ 
fold. 1.) if the respondent has carefully read the 
operational definitions on the cover sheet (see pages 79-81 
& Appendix) then (s)he will equate important problems with 
strategic problems and answer both questions similarly, 2.) 
later question comparisons can be made as a means of 
multiple ratings per subject reliability and agreement 
analysis. As the questions progress from 22 to 25 in the 
questionnaire the frame of reference for the respondent 
becomes more and more personal. Question 22 primarily asks 
what type of planning executives should rely on in making 
important decisions. While question 23 then asks the 
respondent which type of planning is most used, question 25 
asks which kind the respondent personally uses in making 
important or strategic corporate decisions. 
The observed frequencies and relative frequencies are 
computed for each variable and summarized in Tables 9, 10, 
and 11. In addition chi-square statistics are computed to 
test the null hypothesis that the observed frequencies do 
not significantly differ from the equal frequency 
distribution expected if respondents answer randomly. The 
calculations suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Due to other than chance alone, there is a significant 
difference at the .05 level, between how these executives 
responded to questions 22, 23, and 25 and the expected 
equal distribution of their responses on those questions. 
The literature provides no guidelines of what to 
expect in a frequency distribution of executive preference 
for informal plans in making important corporate decisions; 
therefore, a conceivably realistic distribution was 
developed that places 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, and 35% of the 
responses into each of the five categories from formal to 
informal respectively. Based on these expected 
proportions, a second directional chi-square was computed 
to determine if, in fact, these respondents did prefer 
informal plans when making important corporate decisions. 
Expectations suggest that the chi-square value may decrease 
as the expected values come closer to matching the observed 
values. The directional chi-square values shown in Tables 
9, 10, and 11 indicate that each value dramatically 
increases. This suggests that these respondents prefer 
using formal rather than informal plans. To determine if 
this is indeed true, standardized residuals based on the 
skewed expected values, noted earlier, were computed (see 
Tables 9, 10, and 11). These standardized deviates are 
used to examine patterns in the data that contribute to a 
TABLE 9 
Questions Related to Hypothesis 
Q22: When the problem being considered is believed to be 
extremely important to the firm, on what type of 
plans should the top executive rely in making the 
final decision? 
Scale Observed 
Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency (%) 
Standardized 
Residuals 
Formal = 1 35 14.8% +6.7250 
2 60 25.3 +7.4564 
3 95 40.1 +6.9138 
4 27 11 .4 -5.2300 
Informal = 5 5 2.1 -8.5587 
Total n = 237 
Median = 2,668 
Mean = 2.581 
Standard Error = .065 
Standard Deviation = .970 
Chi-Square = 106.919 D.F. = 4 Sign. = .000 
Directed Chi-Square* = 265.056 D.F, = 4 Sign, = ,000 
♦The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5, 
10, 20, 30, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5) 
respectively, as the theory suggests. This chi-square 
value indicates that these respondents are substantially 
different than theoretically expected. 
TABLE 10 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS 
Q23; In making important (as opposed to ordinary or 
routine) strategic decisions which type of plans are 
most used? 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Formal = 1 32 13.5% +5.8535 
2 63 26.6 +8.0727 
3 71 30.0 +3.4279 
4 47 19.8 -2.8581 
Informal = 5 12 5.1 -7.7901 
Total n = 
Median = 
Mean = 
237 
2.746 
2.751 
Standard Error = .073 
Standard Deviation = 1.102 
Chi-Square 50.267 D.F. = 4 Sign. = 
Directed Chi-Square* = 188.999 D.F. = 4 Sign. = .000 
*The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5, 
10, 20, 30, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5) 
respectively, as the theory suggests. This Chi-square 
indicates that these respondents are substantially 
different than theoretically expected. 
TABLE 11 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS 
Q25: In making strategic decisions, which kind of plans do 
you prefer? 
Scale Observed 
Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency (%) 
Standardized 
Residuals 
Formal = 1 42 17.7% +8.7585 
2 63 26.6 +8.0727 
3 73 30.8 +3.7184 
4 44 18.6 -3.2139 
Informal = 5 1 4 5.9 -7.5705 
Total n = 
Median = 
Mean = 
237 
2.678 
2.682 
Standard Error = .074 
Standard Deviation = 1.143 
Chi-Square = 43.53 D.F. = 4 Sign. = .000 
Directed Chi-Square* = 224.29 D.F. = 4 Sign. = .000 
♦The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5, 
10, 20, 20, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5) 
respectively, as the theory suggests. This Chi-square 
indicates that these respondents are substantially 
different than theoretically expected. 
a significant chi-square test. The residual values move 
from positive to negative sign suggesting that these 
respondents do indeed prefer a distribution other than the 
one the theory suggests. 
An analysis of question 22 (see Table 9) asking which 
plans executives should use, indicates that 40.1% of these 
respondents prefer formal plans and 40.1% prefer both 
formal and informal plans while only 13.5% prefer informal 
plans. Based on question 22 and the above chi-square 
tests, a null hypothesis stating that formal plans are 
preferred in making important corporate decisions cannot be 
rej ected. 
Question 23 (see Table 10) asks which plans are most 
used by executives. The results indicates that 40.1% 
prefer formal plans; 30% prefer both formal and informal 
plans; and only 24.9% prefer informal plans. Based on 
responses to question 23 a null hypothesis stating that 
formal plans are preferred by these executives also can not 
be rejected. 
An analysis of question 25, which asks which plans the 
respondent personally prefers, indicates that 44.3% prefer 
formal plans, 30.8% prefer both formal and informal plans, 
and only 24.5% prefer informal plans in making strategic 
corporate decisions. 
These recorded frequencies, when they are examined 
using standardized residuals and chi-square tests, indicate 
that the overall null hypothesis should be rejected. 
Eliasson may, in fact, be wrong, as it appears these 
respondents prefer formal plans over informal plans in 
making important corporate decisions. Further empirical 
studies need to be conducted to substantiate the 
directionality of these findings and to determine how 
executive preferences differ from actual behavior. 
As noted earlier, questions twenty-three and twenty- 
five (see the Appendix) are very similar; therefore, 
responses to these two questions should be highly related. 
An analysis of the level of agreement between these two 
questions (see Table 12) using the Spearman rank order 
correlation shows a very high agreement at the .05 level of 
significance. The overall Kappa's value indicates only a 
moderate degree, beyond chance, of multiple item per 
subject ratings reliability, and McNemars test of symmetry 
suggests inability to reject the null hypothesis that these 
executives are consistent in their answers. The 
reliability of these two items is highly substantiated. 
TABLE 12 
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS 
Q23 with Q25 
Statistic Value Sign df ASE1 T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr. .6981 .001 .045 14.962 
McNemars 
Test 9.610 .3830 9 
Kappas 
Reliability .492 .043 13.563 
Hypothesis £2: The top executive's perceived need to 
"buy time" for later, more permanent decision making is 
significantly related to his/her preference for using 
informal plans in making present time corporate decisions 
(see Mintzberg, et al., 1976). 
This hypothesis, as developed by Mintzberg and his 
colleagues, assumes that most executives find it useful to 
delay making permanent decisions and, therefore, rely more 
on informal plans and gut reactions in their decision 
making. This supports implications by Wrapp (1967) and 
Quinn (198(v) that decisions made from informal plans are 
more easily changed in the future than those made from 
formal plans. 
The questions in the questionnaire related to this 
hypothesis are 24 and 26 (see the Appendix). Each question 
selects a type of plan to be used to make decisions in an 
effort to buy time and then asks the respondent to note 
whether (s)he agrees or disagrees. These two questions are 
mirror images of each other. If a respondent answers 
towards one end of the number line on question 24, (s)he 
should answer toward the opposite end on question 26. 
Tables 13 and 14 display the results of the 
questionnaire responses and the computed statistics. The 
null hypothesis states there is no significant difference 
between the observed frequencies and the expected 
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frequencies as distributed equally among cells. The chi- 
square tests indicate a significant difference; therefore, 
the null is rejected and a directional alternative 
accepted. Since the theory suggests informal plans and 
buying time are related, a second directional chi-square 
value was computed with the preset expected values 
allocated proportionately from 5% to 35% as noted earlier 
in the hypothesis discussion. In question 24, for 
example, 35% of the total 237 responses (82.95) are 
allocated to "strongly agree" and 5% (11.85) is allocated 
to "strongly disagree" with 10%, 20%, and 30% proportions 
allocated to 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Question 26 has 
expected allocations in the opposite direction. If the 
theory is correct, then the directional chi-square value 
should be substantially smaller than that of the equally 
distributed test. A careful review of Tables 13 and 14 
indicates this is not the case. An analysis of the 
standardized residuals for both question 24 and 26 suggests 
no consistent pattern in either direction. A review of the 
frequencies seems to imply that these respondents have 
definite opinions, but that their preferences are not 
significantly skewed toward either formal or informal 
plans. 
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TABLE 13 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §2 
Q24: It is often useful to make an initial decision based 
on informal plans (in an effort to "buy time") and 
later amend or revoke that decision based on formal 
strategic plans. 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Strongly 
Disagree = 1 
(formal) 
12 5.1% +.0436 
2 65 27.4 +8.4835 
3 31 13.1 -2.3821 
4 
Strongly 
11 2 47.3 +4.8505 
Agree = 5 
(informal) 
6 2.5 -8.4489 
Total n = 237 
Median = 3.545 Standard Error = .065 
Mean = 3.155 Standard Deviation = 1.040 
Chi-Square 170.239 D.F. = 4 Sign. 
Directed Chi-Square* = 180.421 D.F. = 4 Sign. = .000 
*The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5, 
10, 20, 30, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5) 
respectively, as the theory suggests. This Chi-square 
indicates that these respondents are substantially 
different than theoretically expected. 
TABLE 14 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §2 
Q26: It is often useful to make an initial decision based 
on formal plans (in an effort to "buy time") and later 
amend or revoke that decision based on informal 
strategic plans. 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Strongly 
Disagree = 1 22 9.3% +2.9485 
(informal) 
2 117 49.4 + 19.1649 
3 35 14.8 -1.8011 
4 49 20.7 -2.6209 
Strongly 
Agree = 5 2 .8 -8.8881 
{formal) 
Total n = 237 
Median = 2.274 Standard Error = .064 
Mean = 2.52 Standard Deviation = .969 
Chi-Square* = 
Directed Chi-Square** = 
170.622 D.F. = 4 Sign. 
118.235 D.F. = 4 Sign. 
.000 
.000 
*A low cell count in scale number 5 (i.e. less than 5 
cases) may have distorted the results of the Chi-Square as 
reported here. The expected cell counts were treated as 
equal in this test. 
**Expected values were preset proportionately at 5, 10, 20, 
30, 35 from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) 
respectively. 
On question 24, 32.5% of the respondents prefer formal 
plans while 49.8% prefer informal plans and 13.1% are 
undecided. In question 26 58.7% prefer informal plans 
while 21.5% prefer formal plans and 13% are undecided. If 
the two questions are taken together, the majority of these 
respondents prefer informal plans for decision making when 
there is a perceived need to "buy time." 
Based on these findings the null hypothesis of no 
difference can be rejected and a directional alternative 
hypothesis accepted. However, a null hypothesis stating a 
preference for formal plans cannot be definitely rejected 
without further empirical research. 
As noted earlier, questions 24 and 26 are mirror 
images of each other. If respondents are responding 
accurately these two questions will be highly negatively 
correlated (see Table 15). The Spearman rank order 
correlation indicates no significant correlation between 
these two variables. The McNemar's test of symmetry 
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that people are 
consistent in their responses. Finally the Kappa value 
indicates very poor agreement, beyond reasonable chance, of 
multiple item per subject ratings reliability. These test 
results suggest no definite conclusions can be drawn about 
hypothesis §2 without conducting further empirical testing. 
In summary hypothesis #2 cannot be adequately tested 
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TABLE 15 
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS 
Q24 with Q26 
Statistic Value Sign df ASEI T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr. .0731 .138 .069 -1 .052 
McNeraars 
Test 29.997 .0009 10 
Kappas 
Reliability .145 .046 3.515 
due to the inconsistencies in the comparisons of responses 
to both question 24 and question 26. Therefore, no 
statistically substantial statements can be made about this 
proposition suggested by Mintzberg, et al. (1975). 
Hypothesis £3: The top executives preference for 
using formal plans in corporate decision making is 
significantly related to the instability and uncertainty of 
the business environment in which the firm operates (see 
Armstrong, 1982; Godiwalla, Meinhart, & Warde, 1981; and 
Kurke & Aldrich, 1983). 
Kurke and Aldrich (1983) suggest that firms operating 
in rapidly changing business environments will require 
executives to use informal plans in their decision making 
due primarily to time constraints and the need for quick 
decisions without lengthy internal discussions. Armstrong 
(1982) and Godiwalla, et.al. (1981) suggests the opposite 
noting that the more turbulent the business environment 
becomes the more necessary it is to make carefully thought- 
out and thoroughly substantiated decisions. He feels the 
corporate executive depends more and more on formal plans 
as change accelerates. 
The survey instrument first presents a series of 
questions that help determine the executive's perception of 
environmental change as related to his/her firm. The 
respondent is then in an appropriately thoughtful frame of 
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mind before being asked to select the best planning method 
for making decisions in that business environment. 
Question 31 (see Table 16) asks the executive to 
choose a type of plan appropriately suited to making 
decisions in his/her present organizational environment 
considering the impact change has on that environment. 
Chi-square statistics are computed to test the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between a random 
distribution of responses, equally dispersed to each 
Likert-like position on the number line, and the observed 
frequency values as received via the questionnaire. A 
difference is found at the .05 level of significance which 
calls for rejection of the null and acceptance of the 
alternative that there is a preference for planning methods 
when the turbulence of the business environment is 
considered. A review of the standardized residuals also 
indicates differences between the expected random 
distribution and the observed distribution of responses. 
Questions 27 thru 30 (see the Appendix) are used to 
determine the amount of change faced by the respondent in 
his/her respective organization. Question 27 (see Table 
17) asks how the firm's marketing practices are affected by 
its changing business environment; question 28 (see Table 
18) asks about product/service life cycles; question 29 
(see Table 19) asks if external environmental changes 
TABLE 16 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS #3 
Q31: Based on your response to questions 27-30 are you more 
likely to use informal or formal plans in making 
important corporate decisions? 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Formal = 1 1 9 8.0% -4.0225 
2 52 21 .9 + .8221 
3 70 29.5 +3.4646 
4 74 31 .2 +4.0518 
Informal = 5 17 7.2 -4.3160 
Total n = 232 
Median = 3.143 
Mean = 3.078 
Standard Error 
Standard Deviation 
= .071 
= .3041 
Chi-Square^ 
Chi-Square^^ 
= 63.905 
= 18.344 
df = 4 Sign, 
df = 16 Sign. 
= .000 
= .3041 
*The expected values are preset at equal in each cell. 
♦♦This chi-square test represents a test of the goodness 
of fit between questions 31 and 30 as suggested in 
hypothesis §3, 
TABLE 17 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3 
Q27: How often must your organization change its marketing 
practices in order to keep up with your competitors 
and the changing market place? 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Rarely = 1 13 5.5% -4 .9965 
2 38 16.0 -1 .3653 
3 66 27.8 + 2 .7016 
4 73 30.8 + 3 .7184 
Frequent = 5 35 14.8 -1 .8011 
Total n = 237 
Median = 3.432 Standard Error .074 
Mean = 3.351 Standard Deviation rr 1 .109 
Chi-Square* = 53 .289 df = 4 Significance .000 
♦The expected values are set at equal in each cell 
TABLE 18 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3 
Q28: How would you describe your organizations product- 
service obsolescence rate? 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Very Slow = 1 28 11 .8% -2.5342 
2 63 26.6 +2.6833 
3 80 33.8 +5.2175 
4 40 16.9 -0.7454 
Very Fast = 5 14 5.9 -4.6212 
Total n = 
Median = 
Mean = 
225 
2.769 
2.773 
Standard Error 
Standard Deviation 
= .072 
= 1.076 
Chi-Square * = 62 .756 df = 4 Significance = .000 
♦The expected values are preset at equal in each cell. 
TABLE 19 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3 
Q29: How much do external changes threaten your firm? 
Scale Observed 
Frequency 
Relative 
Frequency (%) 
Standardized 
Residuals 
Very Little = 1 11 4.6% -5.2870 
2 33 13.9 -2.0916 
3 44 18.6 - .4938 
4 102 43.0 +7.9306 
Great Deal = 5 36 15.2 -1 .6558 
Total n = 237 
Median = 3.745 
Mean = 3.527 
Standard Error = .072 
Standard Deviation = 1.076 
Chi-Square* = 102 .451 df = 4 Significance = .000 
♦The expected values are preset at equal in each cell. 
threaten the organization; and finally question 30 (see 
Table 20) has the executive choose a description of the 
firm's environment. The computed chi-square values for all 
four questions suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no difference between a random equal expected 
distribution of responses and the observed frequency 
distribution at a .05 level of significance. A review of 
the standardized residuals suggests that these respondents 
feel they face both stable and volatile environmental 
changes. 
Questions 27 and 29, when compared to question 31 
(e.g. the executives preference for formal or informal 
plans) (see Table 21), has a significant Spearman rank 
correlation value at the .05 significance level. However, 
only question 28 compared to 31 shows adequate symmetry 
through McNemars test but it does not have a significant 
Spearman correlation. Furthermore none of the comparisons 
has even modest multiple rater reliabilities. 
Of particular interest is how well these respondents 
fit with the theory espoused by Armstrong (i.e. executives 
prefer formal plans for decision making in turbulent 
environments). A perusal of Table 22 establishes that 
there is a very poor relationship between variables 30 and 
31 . If the theory is correct, the Spearman rank order 
correlation should produce an extremely high negative value 
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TABLE 20 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3 
Q30: How would you describe your firm's business 
environment at the present time? 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Stable = 1 7 3.0% -5.8513 
2 43 18.1 -.6113 
3 82 34.6 +5.0653 
4 74 31 .2 +3.9009 
Volatile = 5 30 12.7 -2.5036 
Total n = 236 
Median = 3.329 
Mean = 3.326 
Standard Error 
Standard Deviation 
= .066 
= 1 .010 
Chi-Square* = 81 .754 df = 4 Significance = .000 
♦The expected values are preset at equal in each cell 
TABLE 21 
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS 
Q27 with Q31 
Statistic Value Sign df ASE1 T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr. .1357 .022 .068 -1 .989 
McNemars 
Test 18.807 .0428 10 
Kappas 
Reliability -.043 .034 -1.201 
Q28 with Q31 
Statistic Value Sign df ASE1 T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr. .0952 .080 .068 -1 .399 
McNemars 
Test 9.690 .3234 10 
Kappas 
Reliability -.024 .037 -.647 
Q29 with Q31 
Statistic Value Sign df ASE1 T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr. .1835 .004 .063 -2.886 
McNemars 
Test 37.014 .0001 10 
Kappas 
Reliability -.024 .032 -.712 
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(see Tables 15 and 20). However, there is no significant 
correlation between these two variables. Even more 
interesting is that there is no significant positive 
correlation either. McNemar's test of symmetry indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis that these executives are 
consistent in their responses, and the Kappa value suggests 
a very poor degree of multiple rate reliability. A review 
of the frequencies and standardized residuals in Tables 16 
and 20 shows no particular patterns. The chi-square test 
between questions 30 and 31 (see Table 16) also indicates 
no significant differences between the responses on these 
two items. In summary these analyses suggest there is no 
determinable link between the stability or turbulence of 
the business environment and the types of plans this group 
of executives will use because of that changing 
environment. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected; and, 
therefore, both Armstrong and Kurke & Aldrich may have been 
specious in their comments. Since environmental change 
does not suggest reliance on one planning method over 
another, question 31 becomes simply a question of executive 
preference for types of plans to use in decision making 
irregardless of the business environment. Therefore, as 
one further check on inter-item reliability, question 31 is 
compared to question 25 (see Table 23). A review of the 
Spearman rank order correlation suggests a highly 
TABLE 22 
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS 
Q30 with Q31 
Statistic Value Sign df ASE1 T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr, .0913 .083 .068 -1.352 
McNemars 
Test 19.365 .0359 10 
Kappas 
Reliability .034 .037 .964 
significant relationship at the ,05 level of significance. 
However, the Kappa value notes poor agreement, beyond 
chance, of multiple item per subject ratings reliability. 
While the two variables are significantly related, these 
respondents did not necessarily respond the same way on 
each which is further substantiated by the McNemars test of 
symmetry. 
Hypothesis £4: The top executive's preference for 
formal plans in making a corporate decision is 
significantly related to the risk to the firm of a wrong 
decision (see Armstrong, 1982). 
Armstrong (1982) suggests that if a particular 
decision is extremely risky to the well-being of the firm, 
the executive will prefer formal plans in making that 
decision rather than his/her own personal experience or gut 
feelings (please refer to Chapter III for clarification of 
the definitional differences between risk and importance as 
used in this study). The survey instrument question number 
37 specifically relates to this hypothesis. 
A perusal of Table 24 finds a fairly normal 
distribution of responses in each scale category. The 
standardized residuals offer no consistent pattern that 
substantially deviates from what is suggested by Armstrong. 
Although the chi-square values are not large, chi-square 
statistics indicate a significant difference (at the .05 
TABLE 23 
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS 
Q25 with Q31 
Statistic Value Sign df ASE1 T-Value 
Spearman 
Rank Corr. .6441 .001 .047 -13.264 
McNemars 
Test 20.616 .01 45 9 
Kappas 
Reliability -.007 .033 -.195 
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level of significance) exists between both a random 
distribution of expected values and a preset directional 
distribution of expected values. 
While 47.7% of the respondents have a preference for 
formal plans, nearly one-quarter of the respondents prefer 
using either both types of plans or informal plans. Based 
on the above analysis, the null hypothesis of no difference 
must be rejected and a hypothesis of some preference for 
plans accepted. It appears from a review of the frequency 
distribution that Armstrong is, in fact, correct in his 
supposition that executives prefer using formal plans to 
make decisions that are risky to the firm. However, based 
on a review of the standardized residuals and the chi- 
square values, further empirical testing is needed to 
clearly substantiate the directionality of that preference. 
1 44 
TABLE 24 
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS 
Q37: Which type of plans are most useful in making 
extremely risky, to the firm, strategic decisions? 
Scale Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Formal = 1 53 22.4% -3.2884 
2 60 25.3 -1 .3164 
3 59 24.9 +1 .6848 
4 45 19.0 +4.3753 
Informal = 5 16 6.8 +1 .2056 
Total n = 237 
Median = 2.559 Standard Error = .080 
Mean = 2.618 Standard Deviation = 1.223 
Chi-Square 28.180 df = 4 Sign. = . 
Directed Chi-Square 36.531 df = 4 Sign. = . 
000 
000 
♦The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5, 
10, 20, 30, 35 from "informal" (5) to "formal" (1) 
respectively, as the theory suggests. This Chi-square 
indicates that these responses are substantially different 
from theoretically expected. 
Hypothesis £5: The top executives of Canadian 
corporations are significantly more likely to use formal 
plans in their corporate decision making than are top 
executives of U.S. corporations (Dickerson & Nadeau, 1978 
and Lipset, 1985). 
Dickerson and Nadeau (1978) suggest that Canadian 
executives are more formal in their corporate decision 
making than are their colleagues in the U.S. Malcolm 
(1985) more recently suggests these differences are less 
than in the past and that the Canadians are now much more 
similar to their U.S. colleagues in their preference for 
types of decision-making plans. 
A comparison of the U.S. and Canadian executives was 
done to determine preference for types of plans and for 
rational or intuitive personal styles. Tables 25, 26, and 
27 show the results of these comparisons on the issue of 
preference for formal or informal plans. 
A chi-square test of the differences was conducted for 
questions 21, 25, and 38. The chi-square tests were 
conducted without presetting expected values since they 
were tests of direct relationships, however the reported 
residuals still require preset values for calculation 
purposes. In addition, a goodness of fit analysis between 
the two groups on each variable was administered. This 
procedure (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) looks at the 
TABLE 25 
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS (HYPOTHESIS 5) 
Q25; In making strategic decisions, which kind of plans do 
you prefer? 
Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Scale USA Can USA Can USA* Can* 
Formal = 1 24 18 17.5% 18.0% -.650 -2.829 
2 38 25 27.7 25.0 +2.025 - .863 
3 42 31 30.7 31 .0 +2.789 + .566 
4 29 15 21 .2 15.0 + .306 +1.621 
Informal= 5 4 10 2.9 10.0 -4.470 +2.270 
Statistics U.S. Canada 
n — 137 99 
Median 2.655 2.710 
Std. Error .093 .122 
Mean 2.642 2.737 
Std. Deviation = 1 .090 1 .217 
Chi-Square = 6. 267 df = 4 Sign. = .1801 
Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z = .544 : 2-tailed prob. = .928 
♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions 
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset 
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "informal" (5) to "formal" (1) 
respectively. 
TABLE 26 
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS (HYPOTHESIS 5) 
Q21 : I use informal plans more often than the company's 
formal strategic plans in making my decisions. 
Scale 
Observed 
Frequency 
USA Can 
Relative 
Frequency (%) 
USA Can 
Standardized 
Residuals 
♦USA ♦Can 
Disagree = 1 7 1 5.1% 1 .0% -3.897 -5.717 
2 31 33 22.6 33.0 .688 -1- .606 
3 15 12 10.9 12.0 -2.369 -1.753 
4 65 38 47.4 38.0 -h7.183 ■1-8.931 
Agree = 5 1 3 10 9.5 10.0 -2.751 -l■2.270 
Statistics U.S. Canada 
n = 1 37 99 
Median 3.692 3.526 
Std. Error .097 .112 
Mean 3.351 3.245 
Std. Deviation = 1 .109 1 .084 
Chi-Square = 6.455 df = 4 Sign. = .5907 
Kolmogorov- -Smirnov Z = .627 2-tailed ' prob. = .826 
♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions 
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset 
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "informal" (5) to "formal" (1) 
respectively. 
TABLE 27 
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS (HYPOTHESIS 5) 
Q38: I use the company's formal plans more often than 
informal strategic plans in making my decisions. 
Scale 
Observed Relative 
Frequency Frequency (%) 
USA Can USA Can 
Standardized 
Residuals 
♦USA ♦Can 
Disagree = 1 6 8 4.4% 8.0% -4.088 -1-1 .342 
2 56 38 40.9 38.0 10.507 +8.854 
3 17 9 12.4 9.0 -1.987 -2.460 
4 41 33 29.9 33.0 +2,598 + .547 
Agree = 5 2 3 1 .5 3.0 -4.852 -5.409 
Statistics U.S. Canada 
n — 137 100 
Median 2.482 2.487 
Std. Error .092 .117 
Mean 2.811 2.835 
Std. Deviation = 1 .015 1.118 
Chi-Square = 2.807 df = 4 Sign. = .591 
Kolmogorov- -Smirnov Z = .311 2-tailed . prob. = 1.000 
♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions 
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset 
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "disagree" (1) to "agree" (1) 
respectively. 
equality (homogeneity) of the frequency distributions and 
is extremely sensitive to differences in median, 
dispersion, and skewness. No significant differences are 
found at the .05 level of significance in any of these 
variables. A review of the frequencies and standardized 
residuals for each of these variables again indicates no 
meaningful patterns but does show noticable differences in 
each response cell. The U.S. expected values are preset at 
equal, reflecting a random response, while the Canadian 
expected values are preset proportionately, reflecting the 
theory that Canadian executives are more formal in their 
decision-making. 
A similar analysis of the Canadian - U.S. differences 
in approaches to solving problems (see Table 28) finds no 
substantial differences in either scrutiny of the observed 
frequencies or the standardized residuals. There appear to 
be no substantial differences between U.S. and Canadian 
executives in their general approaches to corporate problem 
solving. Thus the null hypothesis of no difference between 
U.S. and Canadian executives in their preferences for 
formal or informal plans or approaches to corporate 
decision making cannot be rejected. 
TABLE 28 
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS (HYPOTHESIS 5) 
Q1: Would you describe your general approach to solving 
corporate problems as more rational or intuitive? 
Observed Relative Standardized 
Frequency Frequency (%) Residuals 
Scale USA Can USA Can ♦USA ♦Can 
Rational = 1 4 5 2.9% 5.1% -4.470 -5.037 
2 53 34 38.7 34.3 -1-4.891 -1- .789 
3 52 31 38.0 31 .3 -1-4.700 -H2.517 
4 27 26 19.7 26.3 - .076 -1-5.117 
1 
Intuitive^ 5 1 3 1 .0 3.0 -4.661 - .877 
Statistics U.S. Canada 
n — 1 37 99 
Median 2.721 2.839 
Std. Error .070 .097 
Mean 2.766 2.879 
Std. Deviation .825 .961 
Chi-Square = 6 .267 df = 4 Sign. = .180 
Kolmogorov- -Smirnov Z = .671 2-tailed prob. = .758 
♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions 
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset 
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "intuitive" (5) to "rational" (1) 
respectively. 
other Canadian - U.S. Comparisons of Interest 
Two other comparisons useful in describing the 
relationship between U.S. and Canadian executives are 
executive age and years of formal education. A Mann- 
Whitney U test was conducted to determine if these two 
groups are from the same population. The results (see 
Table 7) suggest some significant differences at the .05 
level between the U.S. and Canadian executives on the 
variable of age. The U.S. executives tend to be slightly 
older than their Canadian colleagues. However, there 
appears to be no significant difference between the two 
groups' years of formal education. There also appears to 
be no difference between the two countries on the issues of 
environmental stability (see Table 7). 
Part III -- Verification of the Results 
Non-respondents Versus Respondents 
As noted in Chapter III, there is always a concern 
that those who respond to a mailed questionnaire are 
substantially different from those who don't. In an effort 
to verify the similarities and differences between 
respondents and non-respondents a comparison was conducted 
between those who returned postcards indicating they had 
completed and submitted their questionnaires and those who 
had not returned such a postcard. These two groups are 
compared on the basis of country (see Table 29), number of 
full-time employees, primary business sector in which the 
firm conducts business, and the amount of gross yearly 
sales during 1985 (see Table 30). No significant 
differences were noted between respondents and non¬ 
respondents except for the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 
sector where the lack of respondents in the financial 
sector substantially alters the ability to discuss sector 
to sector comparisons, as related to financial 
institutions, in this study. 
Early versus Late Responses 
Studies conducted by Fowler (1984) imply that there is 
a significant bias between early and late questionnaire 
returns; therefore, the responses to this survey are 
carefully coded so that comparisons of this nature can be 
made. Statistically significant differences between early 
and late time frames are found in the initial pilot study: 
the earlier respondents came from smaller firms. However, 
these tests were conducted using a very small number of 
responses in each cell which can bias the results. A final 
analysis using the full compliment of responses is 
presented in Table 31. No significant differences are 
TABLE 29 
NON-RESPONDENT TO RESPONDENT DIFFERENCES* 
U. S.A. Canada 
Observed 
Freq. 
Relative 
Freq. 
Observed 
Freq. 
Relative 
Freq. 
Responded 76 10.7% 278 39.0% 
Non-Response 78 10.9 281 39.4 
154 21 .6% 559 78.4% 
n = 713 
Chi-Square 
Spearman Corr. 
= .007 
= -.003 
df = 1 
ASE1 = .037 
Sign. 
T-Value 
= .9333 
= -.084 
♦This analysis is based on postcards returned from 
respondents (n=154) indicating they had mailed the 
completed questionnaire. The number of returned postcards 
does not equal the number of returned questionnaires 
(n=237). Undeliverable mail, coded as returned by the post 
office (see Table 5), is deleted from this analysis. There 
are no significant differences between 
respondent/nonrespondents and the variable country. 
TABLE 30 
THE RESPONDENT / NON-RESPONDENT ISSUE 
Response with number of full time employees: 
Chi-Square = .915 df =2 Sign. = .6328 
Spearman Corr. = .024 ASE1 = .037 T-Value = .651 
Response with SIC sector:* 
Chi-Square = 
Spearman Corr. = 
9.252 df =2 
-.058 ASE1 = .039 
Sign. = .0098 
T-Value = -1.486 
Response with gross sales: 
Chi-Square = 5.978 df = 4 Sign. = .2008 
Spearman Corr. = .052 ASE1 = .036 T-Value = - 1.458 
♦There is a significant difference at the .05 level. 
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TABLE 31 
COMPARISON OF EARLY AND LATE RESPONDENTS* 
U.S.A. 
Frequencies 
Pilot: 
15 
Canada 
Frequencies 
20 
Initial Mailing: 
71 36 
Final Mailing: 
46 39 
Telephone Reminder: 
5 5 
Total n 137 100 
Statistics: 
Chi-Square 
Spearman Rank Corr. 
= 7.137 
= .169 
df 
ASE1 
= 3 Sign. = .0677 
= .064 T-Value = 2.642 
Scale: (1) = Initial mailing (2) = Final mailing 
(3) = Pilot mailing (4) = Late reminders. 
*No significant differences are found between "return 
period" and any of the questions related to the five 
hypotheses or to the variables corporate size, gross yearly 
sales, or sic sector. 
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found between U.S. and Canadian respondents and early or 
late returns; nor are there any significant differences at 
the .05 level of significance between early and late 
respondents for the variables of corporate size, as 
determined by number of full-time employees, gross yearly 
sales, and SIC business sector. 
Confounding Variables 
As discussed in numerous places throughout this 
document, previous organizational research has found that 
the variables respondent age, level of education, SIC 
sector, and years in a position affect attempts to analyze 
adequately executive decision making in business 
organizations. Relationships between some of these 
variables and the two countries were explored earlier in 
this document (see Table 7); however, the present intent is 
to partial out the impact these variables may have on the 
relationship between country and other variables of 
interest. Table 32 presents the results of a statistical 
analysis of the effect these variables (age, level of 
education, SIC sector, and years in a position) have on the 
comparison between Canadian and U.S. executives. 
Concerning the executive's approach to decision making 
less than twelve years of education and over twenty years 
of time in the present position both have an impact at the 
TABLE 32 
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES 
Education: Country with D-M Approach (question 1), 
Years 
Statistics <12* 12-14 1 4-1 6 16-18 >18 
Chi-Square 11 .318 2.003 2.117 2.745 1 .554 
df 4 2 3 3 3 
Probability .023 .367 .549 .433 .670 
Spearman Corr .251 -.288 .077 .113 -.057 
ASE1 .175 .242 .119 .126 .169 
T-Value 1 .440 -1 .157 .651 .894 -.339 
Education: Country with personal preference in types of 
plans (question 25). 
Years 
Statistics <12 1 2-1 4 14-16 16-18 >18 
Chi-Square 3.676 2.472 1 .399 1 .441 1 .655 
df 4 4 4 4 4 
Probability .452 .650 .844 .837 .799 
Spearman Corr .175 .288 -.023 -.005 -.044 
ASE1 .167 .247 .115 .134 .171 
T-Value 1 .049 1 .121 -.199 -.039 -.258 
♦Indicates a significant relationship at the .05 level or 
higher. 
TABLE 32 Continued (page 2) 
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES 
CEO Years in Present Position; Country with D-M approach 
(question 1). 
Years 
Statistics < 3 3-6 6-10 1 0-20 >20* 
Chi-Square 4.286 2.344 2.942 .323 15.602 
df 3 2 3 4 3 
Probability .232 .310 .401 .988 .001 
Spearman Corr .065 .031 -.179 .061 .694 
ASE1 .137 .201 .158 .117 .094 
T-Value .478 .154 -1 .137 .519 3.942 
CEO Years in Present Position: Country with personal 
preferences in types of plans (question 25). 
Years 
Statistics < 3 3-6 6-1 0 10-20 >20* 
Chi-Square 2.946 6.049 5.949 3.620 .703 
df 3 4 4 4 4 
Probability .400 .196 .203 .460 .951 
Spearman Corr .229 .268 -.047 -.045 .027 
ASE1 .129 .187 .160 .120 .197 
T-Value 1 .773 1 .415 - .293 -.372 .139 
♦Indicates a significant relationship at the .05 level or 
higher. 
TABLE 32 Continued (page 3) 
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES 
CEO Age: Country with D-M approach (question 1). 
Years 
Statistics <35 35-45 45-55 55-65 >65 
Chi-Square 1 .600 2.494 2.853 4.465 8.573 
df 2 4 4 3 4 
Probability .449 .646 .583 .21 5 .073 
Spearman Corr -.365 -.135 .104 .004 .204 
ASE1 .286 .149 .113 .128 .204 
T-Value -1 .225 -.904 .914 .027 .965 
CEO Age: Country with personal preference in types of D-M 
plans (question 25). 
Years 
Statistics <35 35-45 45-55 55-65 >65 
Chi-Square 1 .600 1 .979 5.187 3.771 3.747 
df 2 4 4 4 4 
Probability .449 .740 .269 .438 .441 
Spearman Corr .122 .109 .091 -.032 -.076 
ASE1 .386 .149 .113 .124 .137 
T-Value .316 .734 .797 -.255 -.552 
TABLE 32 Continued (page 4) 
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES 
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SIC: Country with D-M approach (question 1). 
Statistics Industrial Financial Service 
Chi-Square 4.851 3.516 .691 
df 4 4 3 
Probability .3030 .4755 .8753 
Spearman Corr .044 .185 -.036 
ASE1 .107 .120 .116 
T-Value .416 1 .539 -.310 
SIC: Country with personal preference : in types of 
plans (question 25). 
Statistics Industrial* Financial Service 
Chi-Square 13.864 7.181 3.456 
df 4 4 4 
Probability .0077 .1266 .4846 
Spearman Corr -.119 .033 .198 
ASE1 .108 .119 .112 
T-Value -1 .106 .278 1 .773 
SIC: Country with business environment stability 
(question 30) . 
Statistics Industrial Financial Service 
Chi-Square 4.839 1 .332 3.671 
df 4 4 4 
Probability .3042 .7216 .4523 
Spearman Corr .028 -.127 -.199 
ASE1 .107 .120 .112 
T-Value .257 -1 .062 -1.770 
♦indicates a significance relationship at the .05 level. 
,05 level of significance. Over twenty years of time in 
the present position and a connection with the industrial 
sector also impact the executive's preference for type of 
plans at the ,05 level of significance. When less than 
twelve years of education is taken into account, Canadian 
respondents have a wider range of responses on question 1, 
while the U,S, respondents tend to fall into either number 
line category 2 or 3, When the respondent has been in 
his/her position for over twenty years, the U,S, executive 
tends to favor both rational and intuitive approaches on 
question 1 and both informal and formal plans on question 
25, while Canadian executives selections tend toward 
intuitive approaches to decision making and toward informal 
plans. When the impact the industrial business sector has 
on personal preference for types of plans is considered, 
U,S, executives tend to prefer both formal and informal 
plans, while Canadians in the industrial sector favor 
formal plans. In conclusion, educational level, years in 
the present position, and SIC sector do appear to have a 
moderate effect on the variables of interest in this study; 
therefore, conclusions drawn must be carefully expressed so 
as to note these disturbances adequately. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Restatement of the Study Obj ectiyes 
This empirical study examines the two areas of 
planning and decision-making at the highest echelon of 
business organizations. It is both an exploratory endeavor 
and a measurement investigation that hopes to provide 
practical social and theoretical scientific significance. 
The strategic management literature suggests that 
corporate decision making is really a haphazard and 
disjointed process totally separated from the insights an 
executive might gain from using a formal planning system to 
help make those decisions. Much of this study is aimed at 
determining the validity of that suggestion. 
Other literature in the field of comparative 
management suggests not only that U.S. business executives 
are likely to make very intuitive informal corporate 
decisions but also that their counterparts in Canada are 
more structured and inflexible and, therefore, more likely 
to use very formal systems in their decision making. Since 
these issues are closely related to the original intentions 
of this project, a cross-cultural comparison was deemed a 
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valuable practical extension of the theoretical objectives. 
A review of previous research in this area reveals 
several testable propositions related to the theories of 
corporate planning and decision-making. Since little 
empirical research has been carried out, a measurement 
instrument was developed to explore these hypotheses. The 
TGsults ar© snlig’htGning’. 
Major Findings 
The results of this study do not support the theory 
that business executives prefer making most major decisions 
using intuition and gut feelings. However, the findings as 
presented below are only generalizable to the sample in 
this study and not to the wider population of chief 
executive officers throughout the U.S. and Canada, within 
the study limitations, the findings indicate that both U.S. 
and Canadian CEOs do prefer to use formal plans to make 
extremely important corporate decisions. These surveyed 
executives prefer to use both formal and informal plans in 
situations where they need to "buy time." However, further 
research is needed to determine which of these two 
directions is preferred, therefore, little can be said 
about the issue of "buying time" in the decision making 
process. 
It appears from the results of this study that there 
is no solid link between the turbulence of the environment 
in which the firm operates and the executive decision 
maker's preference for plans. While it seems logical that 
there will be a definite connection between environment and 
types of plans used in decision making, none is found. 
There does appear to be a link between the riskiness of the 
decision to be made and a general executive's preference 
for formal plans in making that decision. 
Finally, there is no significant difference between 
U.S. and Canadian executives in their preference for either 
formal or informal plans in making corporate decisions. 
The only exceptions are the following: Canadian executives 
in the industrial sector appear to prefer more formal plans 
for general decision making than their U.S. colleagues and 
Canadian executives who have been in their top level 
positions longer than twenty years prefer informal plans in 
decision making more than their U.S. colleagues. It is 
also of interest to note that the U.S. executives tend to 
be, on average, four and one-half years older than the 
Canadian executives. A caveat concerning each of-the above 
is that if the executive has been in his position over 
twenty years, has less than twelve years of education, or 
is working in the industrial sector these generalized 
findings cannot be substantiated and further research is 
necessary. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Benefits to the Field of Strategic Management 
Management studies of business executives at the upper 
echelons of corporations are limited in both scope and 
number (see in particular Mintzberg, 1970; Donaldson & 
Lorsch, 1983; and Clifford & Cavanagh, 1985). Most 
research about corporate planning investigates the impact 
on performance of formal planning processes. This study 
investigates the usefulness of formal plans as a tool in 
corporate decision making. Numerous studies suggest there 
is a formal - informal planning dichotomy, but none 
carefully define both terms. One of the requirements for 
pursuing this study was the development of clear and 
concise definitions which can then be reused in other 
studies to broaden our knowledge of informal planning 
dimensions. Some research attempts to present models which 
will help the individual executive more clearly define the 
decision-making framework appropriate to his/her 
personality and style; however, these models avoid 
specifying the value and place intuition has in that 
framework. This study provides clarification for use in 
building future theoretical models that give credence to 
the intuitive side of decision makers' thought processes. 
A new view of both formal and informal planning is 
developed by linking these two tools to the overall CEO 
decision making process. 
The implication is not that substantial and exclusive 
enlightenment is thrust upon the field of strategic 
management, but rather that some vague but interconnected 
concepts are initially explored and related to each other. 
This addition to theoretical knowledge hopefully provides 
both insight and stimulation for more questions. For 
example, since these respondents do not have a distinct 
preference for either formal or informal plans in their 
business environments and since the instability of the 
environments is not significantly different for each of the 
three designated SIC sectors, is it possible that, in 
today's world economy change is so prevalent and rapid that 
any answer/style will do in the short term? 
This study also adds new information to the field of 
Canadian - U.S. management studies. The findings here may 
be preliminary to other studies describing how a world 
market may spawn a new international personality in 
business executives. These findings thus further 
substantiate those of Malcolm (1985) when he suggests that 
Canadian business managers have become less formal and more 
flexible in recent decades and dispute the Lipset (1985) 
descriptions of the traditional, plodding, and ultra 
conservative Canadian executive. 
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Benefits to Corporate Executives 
The implications for corporate executives are that the 
executives who participated in this study do prefer formal 
plans for making important and/or risky corporate 
decisions. However, neither formal nor informal plans are 
substantially preferred for making decisions in turbulent 
environments. Of further interest is that both Canadian 
and U.S. executives feel they primarily use a decision 
making approach that borders on being more rational than 
intuitive. This point is especially interesting since the 
literature related to the Canadian - U.S. perspective 
suggests that U.S. executives tend to be intuitive decision 
makers when, in fact, the respondents in this study are 
much more aligned with the rational approach to decision 
making. 
Recent articles in the popular business press have 
stated that businesses are moving away from formal planning 
systems. The results here suggest that while formal 
planning systems may not provide documentable, added 
financial benefit to the firm, the CEOs find such systems 
very useful in making major corporate decisions. This 
insight may provide a new classification for the value of 
formal planning in U.S. and Canadian corporations. 
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Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Several future areas of research may rise from the 
following limitations of this study. 
First, questionnaire studies have inherent weaknesses. 
The cost of trying to achieve error-free estimates is too 
high for most research purposes, including this one; 
therefore the return rates are often too low to allow for 
generalization from the information obtained. The self- 
selected portion of the sample that actually chooses to 
return the questionnaire is particularly problematic. The 
resulting answers obtained could be minority views and 
atypical of the whole population. Much effort has gone 
into reducing and/or identifying those atypical views in 
this study; however, the results can still not be 
advertised as typical and unbiased responses representing 
the population of U.S. and Canadian business executives. 
Second, it is difficult to know, especially with a new 
measurement instrument, whether the respondents find 
different meanings in the same question. The extensive 
inter-reliability program conducted throughout this study 
has alleviated many of these concerns, but the problem 
cannot be ignored. 
Third, with a mailed survey it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the responses are actually those of the 
targeted individual or those of an assistant or other 
corporate officer. Over 80% of the respondents indicated 
they were from the highest level of the corporation 
including President, CEO, and/or Chairman. The assumption 
is that the objective of targeting top echelon executives 
was substantially met. However, this cannot be verified in 
this study especially since the returns were totally 
anonymous. 
More in-depth interviews need to be made to verify the 
findings further. An expanded observational/interview 
project would help link the executive preferences in 
decision making, as obtained in this study, with the 
executive's actual behavior in making day to day corporate 
decisions. This will be a costly and time consuming future 
research project and its merits must, therefore, be 
carefully weighed against the advantages of further 
substantiating the findings presented herein. 
A comparably low response rate was obtained from 
Canadian financial sector institutions. This may be due 
primarily to the extensive governmental involvement in all 
aspects of business financing in Canada and its relatively 
haphazard involvement in such institutions in the U.S. The 
results obtained via this study, even if further 
substantiated through field study interviews, may not be at 
all typical of the Canadian financial sector. 
Hypothesis §2 had to be abandoned due to the extreme 
inconsistencies in respondent data. It now appears that 
information needs to be gathered concerning the value of 
"buying time" as a corporate decision objective. Perhaps 
the unreliability of the data from the respondents in this 
study was due to a lack of perceived value for such an 
approach to decision making rather than due to indecision 
on the respondent's part. Perhaps these respondents feel 
the term "buy time" connotes a negative approach to 
decision making. It is possible that, in spite of 
extensive prepilot testing of the instrument, these 
executives are not familiar with the terminology at all. 
Future Research Needs 
Further research concerning the business philosophies 
of executives with limited formal education compared to 
those with advanced education will be useful to the field. 
It also will be interesting to validate the connection 
between extensive time in position and the executive's 
decision making style. 
Milman (1986) has concluded that Canadian executives 
favor low risk decisions while their U.S. counterparts 
prefer taking more chances; yet, this study finds no 
difference between the two. Future research should be 
conducted to further test these contentions. As noted 
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earlier, the U.S. popular press has recently explored the 
apparent demise of formal planning systems in major U.S. 
corporations, while this study suggests that U.S. and 
Canadian executives still see a valuable use for such 
systems. Further study is needed to help explain these 
discrepancies. This pool of research exposes a valuable 
use for formal planning systems, i.e., a primary decision 
making tool for top level executives. Further research 
aimed at documenting exactly when, under what conditions, 
and how often business executives turn to formal plans for 
decision making advice will be immensely helpful in 
determining the in house value of such systems. 
Finally, further research in describing and 
identifying the functioning of the executive is a never 
ending need. As Lilienthal noted back in 1967, the 
executive's job is the most demanding, comprehensive, broad 
and yet subtle of all human endeavors. It behooves us to 
understand those who do that work and how they successfully 
accomplish their tasks so that future business leaders can 
build on the knowledge of their predecessors and assure the 
world community of a stable and efficient world economy. 
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
March 26, 1986 
Dear 
We are writing to ask for your assistance in a matter of importance to you and 
other U.S. and Canadian corporate executives. 
Some authors have suggested that Ray Kroc, David Mahoney and Lee lacocca have 
been successful because they use hunches and intuition in making important cor¬ 
porate decisions. Yet, Alfred Sloan, former CEO at General Motors Corporation, 
has been described as anything but an intuitive decision maker. Is there value 
in making major corporate decisions through intuition and gut-feelings? What 
part does a formal planning system play in these decision making episodes? 
These questions and others are being explored through the enclosed survey. 
We are asking a small, select number of U.S. and Canadian top executives of 
major corporations to participate in this survey. Your name is among those 
selected for the study. We would be most grateful if you would complete the 
enclosed questionnaire. Since we are using a small, scientifically-selected 
sample, your responses are very important to the accuracy and reliability of the 
survey. It will take only a short time to complete the questionnaire and return 
it in the enclosed reply envelope. 
We want to assure you that all responses are totally anonymous. They will be 
used only in combination with the responses from your colleagues throughout the 
U.S. and Canada. 
Please return the completed questionnaire at your earliest convenience. Also 
enclosed is a response postcard. Please mail this postcard at the same time you 
complete and return the questionnaire so we may remove your name from our remin¬ 
der list and file your wishes concerning receiving a survey summary report 
and/or a personal interview visit. 
Thank you very much for your assistance in this important study. 
Sincerely, 
r- 
Kent D. Carter 
Principal Investigator 
Enclosures (2) 
w4/6601 
The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
Decartment of Management 
1 74 
Scnooi of Management 
Amnerst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
April 22, 1986 
Dear 
We recently sent you a survey questionnaire and asked your assis¬ 
tance in completing and returning it. Apparently it got lost in 
the mails as we have not, as yet, received it. Would you please 
take the time to fill out the enclosed questionnaire and postcard 
and return it to us as soon as possible. 
We realize this is inconvenient, but due to the limited selection 
of executives participating in this study your individual response 
is necessary to assure accuracy and reliability. 
Again we apologize for this imposition and sincerely extend our 
thanks for completing and mailing the enclosed documents. 
Sincerely, 
Kent D. Carter 
Principal Investigator 
W4/9655 
The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 
Dear Researcher: 
I am sending this postcard at the same time that I am putting 
*my completed questionnaire in the mail. Since my questionnaire 
is completely anonymous this postcard will tell you that you need 
not send me a further reminder to participate in your study. 
Yes, I would like a copy of the study results. 
Yes, I would be interested in participating in 
the confirmatory interview phase of the study. 
□ 
□ 
Name: 
Firm:. 
Street: . 
City:  
State: . Zip Code: 
Telephone:  
Dear Researcher: 
I am sending this postcard at the same time that I am putting 
my completed questionnaire in the mail. Since my questionnaire 
is completely anonymous this postcard will tell you that you need 
not send me a further reminder to participate in your study. 
Yes, I would like a copy of the study results. Q] 
Yes, I would be interested in participating in 
the confirmatory interview phase of the study. □ 
Name:. 
Fir :. 
Address:. 
City:. 
Prov.:. Postal Code:. 
Telephone:. 
Date: 
REQUEST FOE TOP EXECXTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Some CEO’s from both the U. S. and Canada have reported 
that the questionnaire they received last week has been mis¬ 
placed. If you want to be included in this study, but no longer 
have a copy of the questionnaire, you can request another by 
completing and mailing this card. 
Name:. 
Finn: 
Address:. 
City:. 
Prov. Postal Code: 
Telephone:. 
Date: 
REQUEST FOR TOP EXECUTIVE QLTOTIONNAIRE 
Some CEO’s from both the U. S. and Canada have reported 
that the questionnaire they received last week has been mis¬ 
placed. If you want to be included in this study, but no longer 
have a copy of the questionnaire, you can request another by 
completing and mailing this card. 
Name:  
Firm:  
Street:  
City: . 
State: .Zip Code: . 
Telephone:  
U.S. AND CANADIAN 
TOP EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING 
A Survey of CEO Preferences for Formal and Informal Decision-Making 
177 
The purpoee of this questionnaire is to improve our understanding of how top 
corporate executives use and are influenced in their choice between formal and informal 
plana in strategic decision-making. To ensure the accuracy and reliability of this survey, 
this questionnaire should be completed by the top execmthre of the company. Your 
responses are and will remain completely anonymous. 
For the purposes of this study the following operational definitions will be used: 
* Strategic is defined as that which is important to the survival of the firm as 
determined by the top executive decision-maker in terms of actions taken, 
resources committed, and/or precedents set. 
* Rational Decision-Making is defined as the logical, linear, analytical, scientific 
process of making important choices in the presence of an organizational objective 
with the intent of meeting that objective. 
* Intuitive Decision—Making is defined as a relational, unsystematic, subjective,' 
perceptive process of m^ing important choices in the presence of an 
organizational objective with the intent of meeting that objective. 
* Formal Planning is defined as any explicit process that is exemplified by the 
expenditure of resources and the development of written documentation articulating 
the outcome of current decisions (one year or more), the establishment of a 
process(es) to guide and limit these future actions, the combining of the corporate 
level plans into a unified whole, and the systems for monitoring the results. 
* Informal Planning is defined as any implicit process that is an unstructured, 
undocumented, resource expending, and, yet, planned response to business related 
problems, opportunities, or crises. 
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Th« initial aaction of thia queationnairc provklea a 
traoMwork for tht furvty. Reapooaaa to the queations 
below will give a broad overview of you and your 
company’a viewa conceminf the iaaues of tnformal and 
formal plena and daemon-maJan§. 
1. Would you dencribe your general approach to aotving 
corporate probleme ae more rational or intuitive? 
(Pleaee drele the appropriate number) 
Ratiaaal PreUea 
Selviag (Sehriag 
preWaaa wiiheul 
cmetieaai iavohrtaant, 
uaiac tcMatific 
rntthada. A aathe— 
matieai tohitioa 
devoid of 'hofiaaa.* 
1_2_3 
Intuitivo Preblea 
Solviaf (Selvi^ 
problem* iatuiuvely 
then fiadiaf 
data to juatify 
the oelutioa. 
Approprtat* (or 
wlvinc ail pro¬ 
blem* Dot juM (om*. 
4_^6 
6 Compared to other similar organuatmoa how would 
you deaenbe the speed with which top level deciaiona 
are made in your organuation? (Pleaee circhi the 
appropnate number) 
Somewbal slower 
than similar 
0 rf%aiA4(io 00 
I_2 
About th* 
same s* 
otbsto 
3 
Considerably faster 
thsn similar 
orfausation* 
7. To what extent do you confer with other top 
executivee in your organixation concerning strategic 
corporate decieione? (Pleaee ckclc the appropnate 
number) 
To a To Some To a Very To a To No 
Great Extent Little Little Extent 
Extent Extent Extent 
I_2_3_A_5 
2. Do you prefer to baee your decieione on detailed 
informatton or broad general outlinee? (Pleaee deck 
the appropriate number) 
Subataatsal Both Bmad General 
Detail Equally Outliaea 
1_2_3_i_i 
3. When you aaek information on which to baee your 
corporate decintoae, do you prefer formal or informal 
meetinci? 
Disn—ises with 
all intsrted 
orgaaiaadeeal 
members at th* 
same time 
I_2_3 4 
Oiscumioai 
with one 
orgaaiaatlenal 
member at 
a tima 
& 
8. Done your company develop formal plane? (Pleaee refer 
to the definitione on page 1 then chock the 
appropriate box) 
Y» □ No □ 
Noia: If no pkaee proceed to queetion 16. 
9. Pleaee indicate the time period covered by the formal 
plane. (Pleaee check the appropriate box) 
Leeo than 1 year 
1 year to 3 yearn 
3 yearn to 6 yearn 
6 yearn to 7 yearn 
7 yearn or more 
□ 
□ 
□ 
□ 
n many 
4. Whafto if any, techniquen do you nee to hone your 
informal dednion-making abUitlea? 
6. Which do you believe in mom important in making 
soccannfnl corporate decieione: experience and common 
aenee or npecialised training and education? (Pinnae 
dndn the a^ropriate number) 
Bdecariee sad Beth 
—* Tiainiag sts 
sr* meat lapar- squally 
taat la *ucca»- impeetaat 
ful dirisise 
Experience sad 
Cemmea Senes 
sr* meal imper— 
tsnt la eucems 
(ttl iicmiia 
2_3_4^8 
10. How comprehenaiv* are th* formal plane developed by 
your company? (Pleaat ekde the appropriate 
number) 
Vsry Cemprtbenmv* 
(*.g.uB** eutaideta, 
forme sd hoc 
eommitteee. cenduct* 
■welk-ereuad* iatemsl 
sad sxterasl 
eesicbes, iavetvsa 
peoel* with divefss 
bseKgiwuada, eoeeidets 
es msay rsuim 
•e peseible). 
1_2 3 
Vsry Nod—eemprsbeaerv* 
(*.g. rdiet only ea 
idea* o( ea* er 
twe peeple, 
truoestee eesrch 
vis limitiag time 
sad Dumbw e( 
pcopi* iavehred, 
coneidert few 
poeeibl* esuees). 
4_^5 
11. How much corporate attention doee your formal 
planning proceBi r*c*tv* at th* upper levels of th* 
organisatioa? (Pleaee ekcl* th* appropriate number) 
Much Atteetlee 
to formal 
reutiaas. 
1_ 
Little Auentiaa 
ta formal 
reuiiaan 
6 1 2 3 4 
12. How often nre your formal pinna reviewed? (Plenae 
ekcck the npproprinte box) 
Monthly I I 
Quarterly | | 
Binnnunlly | | 
Annually Q 
Other Q 
Sota: if other please describe. _ 
13. How often are your formal plane likely to be 
changed? (pleiM check the appropriate box) 
Continuously | [ 
Weekly [] 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Biannually 
Annually 
Other 
Noia: if other please describe. 
□ 
□ 
□ 
□ 
meetingi, social functions, one-on-one interactions, 
etc.). Please list in rank order of prevalence of use. 
18. How comprehensive are your company’s tnformai 
plans? (Please cbcle the appropriate number) 
V«ry Comprehensivi 
(t.f.uses ouiaidcia, 
forms ad hoc 
eommittoos, conducts 
*wslk-areuad* Internal 
and cxtsmal 
•carchw, iavolvw 
people with dWersa 
beckfTounds, eonaideis 
es many causes 
ts poadble). 
1_2_3 
Very Non-eomprehcDsive 
(e.f. relies only on 
ideas of one or 
two people, 
truncates eaarch 
via limitinc ‘>>as 
and nufflbw of 
people involved, 
con^dert few 
poeMble causes). 
4_^5 
19. How much do you personally participate in developing 
these informal plans? (Please ckcls the appropriate 
number) 
To a To Soas To a To a Very To No 
Great Exteel UtUs Little Extent 
Bxtaal Extent Extent 
I_2_3_4_6 
14. Does your corporation have a department or office of 
planning? (PIsm cheek the appropriate box) 
Y« □ No □ 
If yes, how many years has it been operational? 
If no, was there previously such a dept, or office? 
16. How much do you support the development of formal 
plans for your company? (Please ebeb the 
appropriate number) 
To a To Some To a To a Very To No 
Great Extent Littk Little Extent 
Extent Extent Extent 
I_2_3_4_^6 
18. Does your company use ir^ormal planning? (Please 
refer to the de^tions on page 1 and than chsck the 
appropriate box) 
Y« □ No □ 
17. How are are these company informal plans developed 
or negotiated? (e.g. st^ conferences, committee 
20. Informal plans are more often need for making final 
decisions than are formal plans. (Please drels the 
appropriate number) 
Strongly Dioagrso Undoeidod Agno Strongly 
DIm^so Agroo 
1 2_3_4_^6 
21. I use informal plans more often than the company’s 
formal strategic plans in making my decisions. (Please 
circle the appropriate number) 
Strongly Disagtoo Undoeidod Agroo Strongly 
Dioogroo Agroo 
1_2_3_4_6 
The purpoee of this section is to learn something abont 
your opinioos and attitudes concerning the usee of both 
ir^ormal and formal plans when used to make strategic 
corporate decisions. Please cirele the number on the 
number line below each question that best reflects your 
beliefs concerning the statement. 
22. When the problem being considered is believed to be 
extremely important to the firm, on what type of 
plans should the top executive rely in making the 
final decision? 
Formal Both Informal 
Plaes Equally Plans 
I_2_3_4_^6 
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23. In mnkinf imporitni (u opposed to ordinnry or 
routine) stratefk deciaione which type of pinna arc 
moat used? 
Formal Both Informal 
Plaaa Equally Plana 
I_2_3_4_5 
24. It is often usefol to make an initial decision based on 
tnformal plans (in an effort to *buy time") and later 
anaend or revolu that decision bas^ on formal 
strategic plans. 
Streasly Oisaerta Undteided Afrta Strenfly 
Diaa^ta AfTta 
1_2_3_4_^6 
25. In making strategic decisions, which kind of plans do 
you prefer? 
Formal Beth Informal 
Plans Equally Plaaa 
1_2_3_4_6 
2d. It is oftea nssfal to make an initial dscision bissd on 
formal plans (in an cflort to "buy time") and later 
amend or revoke that decisioa based on informal 
strategic pians. 
Stroaghr CXsigrai Uadeddad Agraa Stronfly 
OiMgm Agraa 
1_2_3_4_^5 
The porpose of the following sectioa is to kam 
something abont your opinions and attitudes concerning 
the ones of both formal and informal plans in oncertain 
and certain bnsineas environments. Please cktle the 
number on the number line befow the question that best 
reflects your beliefi concerning the statement. 
27. How often must your organisation change its 
marketing practices in order to keep up with your 
competitors and the changing market place? 
Rarely ehaafa Fraeiiaatiy (aami- 
our markatiag or mare 
ptmcticas. oftaa) rhssfa 
o«ir praeticaa. 
1_2_3_4_5 
28. How would you describe your organisations 
product/service obsolescence rate? 
V«y SWw 
Rats of Chasfi 
(#4. a bade 
mstai Ska 
cappar). 
I_2_3 
Vary Hish/ 
Fast Rata af 
Ckasfa (#4. 
hshlaa (DM - 
tami-ceoduet«fe). 
4_^5 
29. How much do external changes threaten your 
organuatmn? 
Very littU 
threat to our 
orfuiixacional 
(urvival 
I_2 3_4 
A (Teat deal 
of tnreat to 
orfaaisationaJ 
•urvivai 
5 
30. How would you describe your firms' business 
environment at the present time? 
certaia both urteertain 
MahU.alo« certain and volatile, rapidly 
to chanfa uneenaia chanfioe 
1_2_3_4_S 
31. Based on your response to questions 27-30 are you 
mote likely to use informal or formal plans in inaking 
important corporate decisiona? 
Formal Both loformal 
PlaiM Equally Plana 
1 2 3 4 5 
32. What do yon expect the average lift cycle of new 
products or services in your business to be? (please 
check the appropriau bm) 
Leas than 1 year 
1 year to 3 ytan 
3 yean to 5 yean 
5 yean to 7 yean 
7 yean or mors Q How many? 
33. In what kind of industry or business is your 
company? 
□ 
□ 
□ 
□ 
34. What doss your company make or do? 
The purpose of this section is to learn something about 
your opinions and attitudes concerning the usee of both 
informal and formal plans in making high risk strategic 
decieione. Please circle the number on the number line 
that beet reflects the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the statement. 
35. Does your organisation seem to preftr low rink or 
high tlih projecu? 
A tcadsaey 
tovwd low 
risk projoew 
(ehsaeos (or 
normsl and 
ctneis rasas 
of retuca). 
1_2_3 
A toadasey 
toward hi^ 
riak prajaeta 
(ebaaeas for 
high rasaa af 
rasara). 
4_^5 
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36. Does your orgsoizstion seem to prefer incremental or 
bold direct exploration of the business environment? 
38. I use the company’s formal plans more often than 
tn/ormal strategic plans in making my decisions. 
A »lo«, timid, 
incremental 
exploration of 
the environment 
1_2_3 
A bold, 
wide-ranging 
exploration of 
the environment 
Strongly Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
D>*Mrte Agree 
1_2_3_4_6 
37. Which type of plans are most useful in making 
extremely risky (to the company) strategic decisions? 
Formal Both Informal 
Plans Equally Plans 
1_2_3_4_5 
39. Are you satisfied with the way major decisions are 
made in your organization or would you like to 
institute some major changes in that process? 
Very satisfied 
with our praMnt 
decision-making 
procMS. 
1_2_3 
Need major 
changw in 
our decision¬ 
making proea 
Demographic Information 
40. How many fall time employees does your company have? 
41. How many years of formal education have you attained? 
42. What degree or degrees have you received? 
43. What is your major area of vocational or educational training? 
44. What is your present position (title)? _ 
45. How many years have you been in your present position? 
46. What year did you begin working for this company? 
47. What was your position when you first started working for this company? 
43. With how many other companies have you held full time employment during your 
working years? _ 
49. How many different positions (titles) have you held during your working years? 
50. What is your present age? 
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Thamk yom for your time and cooperation. We appreciate your aasietance in completing 
this questionnaire. If you have any questions regarding the questionnaire, please contact 
the principal investigator, Kent Carter, at the following address. 
Department of Management 
School of Management 
The University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, MA. 01003 
413-649-4030 ext. 318 
To avoid receiving further survey reminders please fill out and mail the enclosed postcard 
when yon mail the completed questionnaire. 
If you are willing to participate in a follow-up personal interview and/or if you would 
like to receive a copy of the study "results summary," please check the appropriate box 
on the encloeed postcard before mailing it. 
Cooiineats (please add any additional information you desire): 
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